The Questionable Constitutionality of Curtailing Cuckolding: Alienation-of Affection and Criminal-Conversation Torts by Bruton, H. Hunter
BRUTON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/22/2015 1:33 AM 
 
Notes 
THE QUESTIONABLE CONSTITUTIONALITY 
OF CURTAILING CUCKOLDING: 
ALIENATION-OF-AFFECTION AND 
CRIMINAL-CONVERSATION TORTS 
H. HUNTER BRUTON† 
ABSTRACT 
  What can you do if your husband or wife cheats on you? Go to a 
marriage counselor? Seek a divorce? Sue the marital interloper for 
millions of dollars in damages? The third option is still available in 
some states through actions euphemistically titled “alienation of 
affection” and “criminal conversation.” This Note tackles their 
constitutionality in light of the Supreme Court’s growing body of 
jurisprudence dealing with intimate relations and marital status. Put 
simply, it attempts to answer the question: Is there a constitutional 
right to commit adultery? After exploring both the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments as avenues for establishing this right, this 
Note explains how states could tailor these torts to pass constitutional 
scrutiny. It also discusses specific concerns regarding matters of 
marital choices raised by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Obergefell v. Hodges. Though there is no definite answer, this Note 
covers as much ground as possible to see if states have any room to 
constitutionally curtail cuckolding. 
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INTRODUCTION  
An overwhelming majority of Americans find adultery morally 
unacceptable.1 Adultery can impose emotional tolls on families, cause 
financial problems, and lead to costly divorces. However, even these 
costs can pale in comparison to the tort liability facing the adulterous 
spouse’s paramour in states where the torts of alienation of affection 
and criminal conversation still exist.2 These actions allow a wronged 
spouse to recover damages from the marital interloper,3 even 
capturing the dalliances of celebrities including the Vanderbilts4 and 
professional golfer John Daly.5 Scholars have noted that these torts 
raise serious policy questions.6 The more fundamental legal question 
is whether they can withstand a constitutional challenge. 
Although these torts may at first seem to be a laughable vestige 
of a bygone era, both have very real consequences for defendants 
obligated to pay millions of dollars in damages.7 These seven-figure 
judgments do not stem from just a few rogue juries; judges also hand 
down million-dollar damages awards.8 These awards often withstand 
appellate review and as recently as 2014 a state appellate court 
 
 1. Frank Newport & Igor Himelfarb, In U.S., Record-High Say Gay, Lesbian Relations 
Morally OK, GALLUP (May 20, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/162689/record-high-say-gay-
lesbian-relations-morally.aspx [http://perma.cc/KZ5A-YH5P]. 
 2. These judgments are often in the millions of dollars and can force the defendants into 
bankruptcy. Cullen Browder, NC One of Seven States that Makes Cheaters Pay, WRAL.COM 
(Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.wral.com/nc-one-of-seven-states-that-makes-cheaters-pay/13599861 
[http://perma.cc/4E2H-RGZ7]. For the states that retain these actions, see infra notes 32–37, 42–
45, and accompanying text. 
 3. See infra Part I. 
 4. See infra note 62. 
 5. Randy Wallace, Alienation of Affection Case with John Daly Headed Back to Court, 
RANDYWALLACE (Feb. 11, 2015), https://randywallace.wordpress.com/2015/02/11/alienation-of-
affection-case-with-john-daly-headed-back-to-court [http://perma.cc/ER6Z-7TCW].  
 6. See, e.g., Jennifer E. McDougal, Comment, Legislating Morality: The Actions for 
Alienation of Affections and Criminal Conversation in North Carolina, 33 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 163, 180–88 (1998) (analyzing policy justifications behind the two torts). 
 7. See, e.g., Lance McMillian, Adultery As Tort, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1987, 1990–91 (2012) 
(noting the recent seven-figure damage awards in North Carolina). 
 8. One North Carolina judge recently awarded approximately $5.8 million in damages in 
an alienation-of-affection and criminal-conversation case. Paul Thompson, Spurned Wife Sues 
Her Husband’s Mistress – and WINS $5.8 million, DAILYMAIL.COM, (Sep. 9, 2010 7:47 AM), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1310322/Spurned-wife-Lynn-Arcara-sues-husbands-
mistress-WINS-3-75m.html [http://perma.cc/JXZ8-FKL5].  
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affirmed a verdict for $9 million in compensatory and punitive 
damages for alienation of affection and criminal conversation.9 
Hutelmyer v. Cox10 provides a glimpse into court review of these 
high damages,11 with facts fit for a Lifetime special. In Hutelmyer, a 
wife brought alienation-of-affection and criminal-conversation claims 
against her ex-husband’s paramour/secretary.12 She received 
compensatory damages for alienation of affection based on emotional 
harm and consortium rights.13 Articulating the basis for criminal-
conversation compensatory damages, however, always presents an 
awkward challenge because someone can only commit the tort by 
engaging in sexual conduct.14 Thus, affirming compensatory damages 
for criminal conversation implicitly validates the notion that one has a 
compensable property interest in one’s spouse that is violated even if 
the adulterous spouse consents. Nonetheless, the court summarily 
affirmed the compensatory damages and danced around the 
uncomfortable implications by stating that “the measure of damages 
is incapable of precise computation.”15 The court also affirmed the 
punitive damages for alienation of affection because of the public 
nature of the adulterous relationship and the paramour’s knowledge 
of the husband’s marriage.16 The court sustained the punitive damages 
for criminal conversation based on nothing more than the conduct 
required to establish the tort.17 
Given the obvious lack of guiding principles when dealing with 
love affairs, it may not be shocking that punitive damages bear little 
to no relation to the compensatory damages.18 In one case, the North 
Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed damages for alienation of 
affection and criminal conversation “award[ing] $1.00 in 
 
 9. Shackelford v. Lundquist, No. COA13-960, 2014 WL 1791267, at *2, *7 (N.C. Ct. App. 
May 6, 2014), appeal denied, 762 S.E.2d 460 (N.C. 2014) (mem.).  
 10. Hutelmyer v. Cox, 514 S.E.2d 554 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999). 
 11. Id. at 560–63.  
 12. Id. at 557–58. 
 13. Id. at 561.  
 14. See infra Part I.B. 
 15. Hutelmyer, 514 S.E.2d at 561 (citation omitted).  
 16. Id. at 560.  
 17. Id. (“[T]he same sexual misconduct necessary to establish the tort of criminal 
conversation may also sustain an award of punitive damages.” (quoting Horner v. Byrnett, 511 
S.E.2d 342, 345 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999))). 
 18. These damage awards themselves may raise constitutional concerns, a possibility I do 
not explore in this Note. For a discussion of these concerns, see infra notes 104–12 and 
accompanying text. 
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compensatory damages for alienation of affection and criminal 
conversation and $85,000.00 in punitive damages for criminal 
conversation.”19 The problems of excessive or disproportionate 
damages in these cases have plagued common-law courts for 
centuries.20 
One pivotal question remains: Does the adulterer have a 
constitutional right to adultery?21 This Note argues that Fourteenth 
Amendment substantive-due-process and First Amendment intimate-
association precedent calls into question the constitutionality of these 
torts. It then suggests an alternate legal approach that would largely 
achieve these torts’ goals within constitutional bounds. Although 
these torts present constitutional problems, civil recourse may not be 
constitutionally impermissible in all respects. A tort of marital 
interference could replace alienation of affection and criminal 
conversation, serving the same interests without running afoul of the 
Constitution. This may not require creating a new tort, but could be 
yet another court-engineered retooling22 of the current tort 
frameworks. If this proposal is not—or cannot—be adopted in states 
retaining the actions, alienation of affection still has a high probability 
of passing constitutional scrutiny. But even if alienation of affection 
could stand as a claim, criminal conversation is likely 
unconstitutional. 
This Note proceeds in five Parts. Part I outlines the two actions, 
including their historical roots. Part II locates the state action in these 
tort judgments, which makes them susceptible to constitutional 
analysis. Part III attempts to locate a possible constitutional right to 
adulterous sexual conduct or intimate relationships, pausing briefly to 
mention an argument for marriage as a contract waiving these rights. 
Part IV weighs the possible government interest in maintaining these 
actions against the mediums that these actions represent—assuming a 
 
 19. Horner, 511 S.E.2d at 344. 
 20. See, e.g., Hewlett v. Cruchley, (1813) 128 Eng. Rep. 696, 698; 5 Taunt. 277, 281. 
(“Nevertheless it is now well acknowledged in all the courts of Westminster-hall, that whether 
in actions for criminal conversation, malicious prosecutions, words, or any other matter, if the 
damages are clearly too large, the Courts will send the inquiry to another jury.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 21. At least one North Carolina Superior Court judge does not think so. In Rothrock v. 
Cooke, No. 14CVS870, 2014 WL 2973066 (N.C. Super. Ct. June 11, 2014), the judge decided that 
alienation of affection and criminal conversation violated the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at *10. 
 22. For a discussion of how courts revised the torts following the Married Women’s 
Property Acts, see infra notes 70–81. 
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level of scrutiny somewhere above traditional rational-basis review, 
but below strict scrutiny. Part V discusses the complications raised by 
the Supreme Court’s recent holding establishing same-sex marriage as 
a constitutional right.23 Part V.A offers a way to conform the torts to 
the new ruling. And despite this Note’s attempts to avoid policy 
discussions, Part V.B suggests that the Supreme Court’s disentangling 
of state involvement from matters of marital choice might result in 
the total abolition of these torts. 
I.  ALIENATION OF AFFECTION AND CRIMINAL CONVERSATION 
A. Alienation of Affection 
Although the formulation of the action can vary from state to 
state, in general “the essential elements of an action for alienation of 
affection are the marriage, the loss of affection or consortium, the 
wrongful and malicious conduct of the defendant, and a causal 
connection between such loss and such conduct.”24 The plaintiff need 
not prove an untroubled marriage, only that her spouse had some 
love or affection, and that it was lost “as a result of defendant’s 
wrongdoing.”25 Nor must the plaintiff show intent to destroy the 
marriage on the part of the defendant—intent to engage in the 
extramarital affair is all that is required.26 It is also of no legal 
consequence that other causes—spousal neglect, annoying in-laws, 
differing opinions on Seinfeld, and other serious issues—may have 
contributed to marital problems.27 Moreover, courts exclude many 
defenses from alienation-of-affection actions.28 Perhaps most 
bizarrely, the adulterous spouse’s consent does not serve as a 
 
 23. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015). Now that marriage is a 
constitutionally defined right for all regardless of the gender of the spouse one chooses, 
differentiations between same-sex and opposite-sex marriage will no longer be necessary. 
Nevertheless, this Note retains the dichotomy to discuss implications for two torts based solely 
on the concept of marriage as between a man and a woman. 
 24. Bishop v. Glazener, 96 S.E.2d 870, 873 (N.C. 1957) (citations omitted). 
 25. Brown v. Hurley, 477 S.E.2d 234, 237 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (citation omitted).  
 26. Bishop, 96 S.E.2d at 873; see also Jeffrey Brian Greenstein, Sex, Lies and American 
Tort Law: The Love Triangle in Context, 5 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 723, 732 (2004) (“[Alienation 
of affections] did require intent but not a specific intent or conscious design to interfere with the 
existing marital relationship.”). 
 27. See Bishop, 96 S.E.2d at 873 (“The wrongful and malicious conduct of the defendant 
need not be the sole cause of the alienation of affections.”). 
 28. See, e.g., McDougal, supra note 6, at 167 (discussing the defenses North Carolina courts 
exclude).  
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defense.29 Furthermore, in some jurisdictions, the defendant’s 
ignorance of her counterpart’s marital status is not a defense.30 In 
alienation-of-affection actions, the interference need not be sexual in 
nature, and—with some limited exceptions—a plaintiff can bring an 
action for alienation of affection against other third parties who 
merely proffer advice that contributes to the harm or dissolution of 
the marriage (so watch out, meddling in-laws).31 Alienation of 
affection is still a viable32 tort claim in five states: Mississippi,33 
Hawaii,34 North Carolina,35 South Dakota,36 and Utah.37 
B. Criminal Conversation 
Unlike alienation of affection, criminal conversation requires 
only “actual marriage between the spouses and sexual intercourse 
between the defendant and the plaintiff’s spouse during the 
coverture.”38 Adulterous sexual intercourse is the crux of the claim.39 
 
 29. Id. at 166–67 (“[T]he fact that the spouse willingly entered into or even initiated the 
relationship does not negate the malice element.”); Fitch v. Valentine, 959 So. 2d 1012, 1032 
(Miss. 2007) (Dickinson, J., concurring) (noting that “consent was historically prohibited as a 
defense to alienation actions”). 
 30. McDougal, supra note 6, at 166. But see Bearbower v. Merry, 266 N.W.2d 128, 130 
(Iowa 1978) (noting—in a case before the tort was abolished—that “[t]he only general defenses 
to an action for alienation of affections are plaintiff’s consent, defendant’s lack of knowledge of 
the existence of the marriage, and the statute of limitations”). 
 31. Greenstein, supra note 26, at 732; McDougal, supra note 6, at 167–68. 
 32. The claim’s status in New Mexico is uncertain. The New Mexico Supreme Court has 
not expressly abolished it, despite lower courts frequently expressing how the tort is inconsistent 
with New Mexico’s public policy. See, e.g., Padwa v. Hadley, 981 P.2d 1234, 1240 (N.M. Ct. App. 
1999) (“[O]ur Supreme Court has not yet formally abandoned the doctrine . . . .”); Thompson v. 
Chapman, 600 P.2d 302, 304 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979) (noting the tort should be abolished as 
against public policy, but the appellate court does not have the power to do so).  
 33. Fitch, 959 So. 2d at 1020 (“[T]his Court declines the invitation to abolish the common 
law tort of alienation of affections in Mississippi.”).  
 34. Although not exercised frequently, the action still appears to be viable in Hawaii. See 
Hunt v. Chang, 594 P.2d 118, 123 (Haw. 1979) (“The action for alienation of affections has not 
been abolished by statute in this jurisdiction.”). 
 35. Brown v. Ellis, 678 S.E.2d 222, 224 (N.C. 2009) (exerting personal jurisdiction over a 
California defendant in a suit for alienation of affection and criminal conversation). 
 36. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Harbert, 741 N.W.2d 228, 234 (S.D. 2007) (holding that 
alienation of affection is a cause of action under South Dakota law).  
 37. Heiner v. Simpson, 23 P.3d 1041, 1043 (Utah 2001) (holding that the plaintiff could 
bring a claim for alienation of affection as a matter of law).  
 38. Sebastian v. Kluttz, 170 S.E.2d 104, 109 (N.C. Ct. App. 1969).  
 39. Laura Belleau, Farewell to Heart Balm Doctrines and the Tender Years Presumption, 
Hello to the Genderless Family, 24 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 365, 367 (2012). An interesting 
question is what counts as “sexual intercourse” for the tort of criminal conversation. The 
question is salient for plaintiffs who wish to bring a criminal-conversation claim where the 
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Criminal conversation does not include an intent element and 
operates as a strict-liability tort.40 With the exception of the statute of 
limitations, the only defense to criminal conversation is approval from 
the nonadulterous spouse before the intercourse.41 Criminal 
conversation is still a viable tort claim in four states: Hawaii,42 
Kansas,43 Maine,44 and North Carolina.45 
C. History of the Torts 
Alienation of affection and criminal conversation grew out of the 
belief that a husband owned his wife and was entitled to 
compensation for a lost property interest in her sexual fidelity.46 The 
earliest English common-law system assumed this justification 
through the writs of ravishment and abduction, which “allowed the 
wife to be listed as one of the husband’s chattels. He could use this 
writ to get his wife back if she was taken by force or left under her 
 
sexual conduct does not include penile-vaginal intercourse, see, e.g., Blaylock v. Strecker, 724 
S.W.2d 470, 471–72, 476 (Ark. 1987) (upholding application of alienation-of-affections tort 
where the wife had a relationship with another woman), or if a plaintiff brings a claim for 
criminal conversation in same-sex marriages, heretofore unchartered territory. Given that a tort 
restricting penile-vaginal intercourse would infringe the right outlined later in this paper, this 
question does not need to be reached. See infra Part III. For an interesting discussion on how 
courts handle this conundrum in the context of criminal-adultery statutes, see Peter Nicolas, The 
Lavender Letter: Applying the Law of Adultery to Same-Sex Couples and Same-Sex Conduct, 63 
FLA. L. REV. 97, 117–19 (2011).  
 40. Caroline L. Batchelor, Comment, Falling Out of Love with an Outdated Tort: An 
Argument for the Abolition of Criminal Conversation in North Carolina, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1910, 
1937 (2009). This construction of criminal conversation as a strict-liability tort continues, despite 
Supreme Court dicta suggesting it should be otherwise. See Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 
63 (1998) (dictum) (noting that a previous bankruptcy case “placed criminal conversation solidly 
within the traditional intentional tort category”). 
 41. McDougal, supra note 6, at 169–70. Some states have statutorily constrained criminal-
conversation actions if the conduct occurred when the spouses were separated. See N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 52-13 (2013) (disallowing actions arising from conduct that occurred after separation).  
 42. Batchelor, supra note 40, at 1915 n.35 (identifying Hawaii as a jurisdiction where the 
tort is still viable). However, I could not find a more recent reported Hawaii case discussing 
criminal conversation than one dating back to 1896. Republic of Hawaii v. Kuhia, 10 Haw. 440, 
441 (Haw. 1896). 
 43. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-428 (West 2005) (holding that there is no marital privilege for 
confidential communications in a cause of action for criminal conversation); see also Drennan v. 
Chalfant, 282 P.2d 442, 445 (Kan. 1955) (bringing a cause of action for criminal conversation). 
 44. Collett v. Bither, 262 A.2d 353, 357 (Me. 1970) (recognizing criminal conversation as a 
distinct tort apart from alienation of affection).  
 45. Brown v. Ellis, 678 S.E.2d 222, 224 (N.C. 2009) (exerting personal jurisdiction over a 
California defendant in a claim for alienation of affection and criminal conversation). 
 46. See Hoye v. Hoye, 824 S.W.2d 422, 424 (Ky. 1992) (“The Anglo-Saxons based actions 
against third parties involving tortious interference with the marriage relation in trespass.”). 
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own freewill.”47 These early cases described the adulterous activity as 
the cuckolding paramour kidnapping the wife and robbing the 
husband, even when the underlying actions were consensual sex 
between the wife and paramour.48 
Thirteenth-century English pleading and jurisdictional 
requirements necessitated these legal fictions. Ecclesiastical Courts 
had “exclusive jurisdiction over all matters relating to the marital 
relationships” and these courts could only administer social 
punishment.49 For the husband to obtain monetary damages, he had 
to bring his case in the Royal Courts under the established writs of 
abduction or ravishment.50 Under these writs, the wife was property; 
“[w]hen a man trespassed on another man’s wife, the adulterer was 
obliged to pay damages for the injury as if he had taken the plaintiff’s 
livestock or gone uninvited onto the plaintiff’s land.”51 
It was not until the seventeenth century that true civil adultery 
actions took form.52 The civil actions came from laws and actions 
regulating “master/servant relations, where a party would be held 
civilly liable for ‘enticing’ away a servant from the master or 
physically injuring the servant, leading to a loss of services.”53 This 
promoted the wife from chattel to indentured servant (Progress!).54 
This new framework necessitated a new justification for 
compensation. Courts no longer imagined the compensable loss in an 
ownership interest in the wife, but instead in owning an exclusive 
right to her services.55 Civil recovery for adultery found a new home 
 
 47. Veeder v. Kennedy, 589 N.W.2d 610, 614 n.2 (S.D. 1999) (citation omitted). 
 48. LAURA HANFT KOROBKIN, CRIMINAL CONVERSATION: SENTIMENTALITY AND 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY LEGAL STORIES OF ADULTERY 27–28 (1998). 
 49. Id. at 44. 
 50. Id. at 44–45. 
 51. Batchelor, supra note 40, at 1914. 
 52. KOROBKIN, supra note 48, at 49.  
 53. Greenstein, supra note 26, at 731.  
 54. Macfadzen v. Olivant, (1805) 102 Eng. Rep. 1335, 1336; 6 East 387, 389–90 (“No doubt 
that an action of trespass and assault may be maintained by a master for the battery of his 
servant per quod servitium amisit; and so by a husband for a trespass and assault of this kind 
upon his wife per quod consortium amisit.”). The husband’s loss of a wife was also compared to 
a master’s loss of a servant: 
[T]he action is not brought in respect of the harm done to the wife, but it is brought 
for the particular loss of the husband, for that he lost the company of his wife, which 
is only a damage and loss to himself, for which he shall have this action, as the master 
shall have for the loss of his servant’s service. 
Guy v. Livesey, (1619) 79 Eng. Rep. 428, 428; Cro. Jac. 501, 502. 
 55. KOROBKIN, supra note 48, at 137.  
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in claims of criminal conversation and loss of consortium.56 This legal 
shift also led to the development of a distinct action for enticement, 
which included action when no adultery took place.57 Enticement 
“evolved into the modern day alienation of affections tort.”58 The 
mother-in-law became as accessible a target as the paramour.59 
The United States inherited the English common-law system and 
adopted the English rationales for torts.60 American courts also 
emphasized another reason for compensating the husband, namely 
the “genealogical uncertainty that might surround the offspring of his 
adulterous wife.”61 Cases of criminal conversation and alienation of 
affection abounded in nineteenth- and twentieth-century America, 
involving well-known public figures such as the Vanderbilts.62 As in 
England, these actions were originally limited to husbands, and a wife 
had no right to civil redress against her husband’s inamorata.63 
Courts justified this limitation on many grounds, but most 
justifications fit under the broad moniker of the “natural and 
unchangeable conditions of husband and wife.”64 Duffies v. Duffies65 
echoes views prevalent at the end of nineteenth-century America. In 
denying women the right to bring an alienation-of-affection claim, the 
court highlighted the wife’s domestic role and elevated women to a 
 
 56. Id. at 49.  
 57. See, e.g., Winsmore v. Greenbank, (1745) 125 Eng. Rep. 1330, 1330–31; Willes 578, 578–
79 (listing the elements of enticement and their application to the counts in this case). 
 58. Michele Crissman, Note, Alienation of Affections: An Ancient Tort—But Still Alive in 
South Dakota, 48 S.D. L. REV. 518, 519 (2003). 
 59. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, GUARDING LIFE’S DARK SECRETS: LEGAL AND SOCIAL 
CONTROLS OVER REPUTATION, PROPRIETY, AND PRIVACY 117 (2007).  
 60. See, e.g., Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 481 (1904) (discussing criminal conversation). 
 61. Kyle Graham, Why Torts Die, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 359, 407 (2008). 
 62. FRIEDMAN, supra note 59, at 117. Alfred Vanderbilt, millionaire playboy of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, is best known for famously giving his life to save others 
during the infamous sinking of the Lusitania. What many do not know is that his chivalry did 
not extend to his marital choices. His first wife divorced him after he committed adultery aboard 
a private railway car with the also-married Mary Agnes O’Brien Ruiz, the wife of a Cuban 
diplomat in Washington. The divorce cost him $10 million dollars and considerable reputational 
costs when Ms. Ruiz committed suicide by poison after her husband left her. In 1911, Alfred 
married a divorcee, whose husband “threatened to sue Vanderbilt for alienation of affection, 
but the two later settled out of court.” Mr. Alfred Gwynne Vanderbilt, THE LUSITANIA 
RESOURCE, http://www.rmslusitania.info/people/saloon/alfred-vanderbilt [http://perma.cc/
0FXQ-5YV6].  
 63. E.g., Doe v. Roe, 20 A. 83, 84 (Me. 1890) (refusing to extend the civil actions to wives).  
 64. Duffies v. Duffies, 45 N.W. 522, 525 (Wis. 1890). 
 65. Duffies v. Duffies, 45 N.W. 522 (Wis. 1890). 
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higher moral plane.66 The husband meanwhile had understandable 
moral weaknesses because of his duty to provide for the family, and 
“[t]he wife had reason to expect all these things when she entered the 
marriage relation, and her right to his society has all these conditions, 
and is not the same in ‘degree and value’ as his right to hers.”67 This 
narrative of man’s supposedly reasonable weakness explained the 
reasons women had no right to bring these actions. Moreover, judicial 
concerns for the floodgates of litigation demanded that this action be 
limited to male plaintiffs: “[A]ctions by the wife for the loss of his 
society would be numberless. This right of action in the wife would be 
the most fruitful source of litigation of any that can be thought of.”68 
Yet, not even these impenetrable arguments for judicial 
economy could slow the tide of mounting pressures for social equality 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.69 The same legal 
advocates who established the Married Women’s Property Acts70 
pushed most states to allow women to bring both tort actions.71 This 
extension led to uncertainty over the rationales underlying the torts, 
and “necessitated adjusting their rationale.”72 As one commentator 
suggested, “[i]f women were to be permitted to bring civil adultery 
cases against other women, a new set of story-making assumptions 
would have to be found that would recognize wives as speaking 
subjects with enforceable marital rights.”73 
Courts accomplished this shift by extending the right of marital 
services to women and by reframing the actions as protections for 
marital intimacy.74 Courts claimed that the torts compensated 
emotional harm and loss of “spousal consortium.”75 The early English 
 
 66. Id. at 525. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id.  
 69. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 59, at 119 (“The rule that a woman was not entitled to sue 
for alienation of affections or criminal conversation weakened considerably in the early 
twentieth century and even earlier in some states.”).  
 70. The name given to a collection of state laws enacted at various times during the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries that gave married women many rights including, “the power 
to sue and be sued, to conduct business in their own names, and to keep their own property.” 
KOROBKIN, supra note 48, at 127; see also Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status 
Law: Adjudicating Wives’ Rights to Earnings, 1860–1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2132–41 (1994) 
(discussing the history of the Acts and scholarship surrounding them).  
 71. McDougal, supra note 6, at 165.  
 72. Hoye v. Hoye, 824 S.W.2d 422, 424 (Ky. 1992). 
 73. KOROBKIN, supra note 48, at 138.  
 74. Id. at 139, 144; see also supra note 69 (describing this shift). 
 75. Graham, supra note 61, at 407. 
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shift from grounding these torts not in trespass, but instead in a loss of 
services, proved vital to their survival as a tool for both spouses.76 A 
husband or wife surely could not sue in court to compel his or her 
spouse to offer affection and attention, but the spouse could sue if 
someone else violated that right to marital services.77 After this shift, 
concerns over legitimacy of children,78 inheritance, and other 
husband-centric concerns gave way to the idea that the two torts were 
a “means to preserve marital harmony by deterring wrongful 
interference.”79 These torts took on the new role as guardians of 
marriage as an institution. In the states where the actions remain, 
these justifications reign.80 Not all courts and states found this 
adjustment persuasive though; the shaky precedential grounds 
combined with the torts’ potential as a means of blackmail and 
extortion led many state legislatures and judiciaries to abolish the 
torts during the twentieth century.81 
II.  STATE ACTION: ANCHORING A CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE 
Torts must involve some kind of state action to be subject to 
constitutional analysis.82 Three potential bases could explain how 
alienation of affection and criminal conversation constitute state 
action: 1) statutory enabling of the torts as state action, 2) Supreme 
Court precedent on private civil actions as state action, or 3) punitive 
damages as state action. Judicial enforcement of these torts 
represents state action on at least one of these theories. 
 
 76. KOROBKIN, supra note 48, at 139. 
 77. Id. at 137. 
 78. Graham, supra note 61, at 407 (“This explanation obviously did not apply to criminal 
conversation suits brought by a wife, who could be pretty well assured that her children were 
her own.”). Modern advances in paternity testing also belie any concern over legitimacy or 
inheritance questions. See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 185 (1992) (discussing the 
effects “a cheap and infallible paternity test” would have on the harm caused by adultery).  
 79. Hoye v. Hoye, 824 S.W.2d 422, 424 (Ky. 1992) (citation omitted); see also Helsel v. 
Noellsch, 107 S.W.3d 231, 232 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (“Modern courts came to justify suits for 
alienation of affection as a means of preserving marriage and the family.” (citations omitted)). 
 80. See Graham, supra note 61, at 420 (discussing modern cases).  
 81. FRIEDMAN, supra note 59, at 210–11. Other factors likely contributed to the torts’ 
demise as well. For an in-depth discussion of the abolition of criminal conversation, alienation 
of affection, and other related torts, see Graham, supra note 61, at 406–30.  
 82. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964). 
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A. Statutory State Action 
In some states, statutes validate or define the common-law 
actions of alienation of affection and criminal conversation.83 For 
instance, North Carolina General Statutes section 4-1 declares that 
the common law is in force within the state of North Carolina,84 and 
North Carolina General Statutes section 52-13 defines the procedures 
in causes of action for alienation of affection and criminal 
conversation.85 Statutes clearly constitute state action, and if they do 
not merit heightened constitutional scrutiny, it is for another reason.86 
B. Tort Actions as State Action 
As early as 1948, the Supreme Court held that judicial 
enforcement in civil lawsuits could constitute state action.87 In Shelley 
v. Kraemer,88 the Court found state action in court enforcement of 
private contract and proclaimed that “it has never been suggested 
that state court action is immunized . . . simply because the act is that 
of the judicial branch of the state government.”89 
The Court has similarly applied the state-action doctrine to 
judicial enforcement of tort awards.90 In New York Times Co v. 
Sullivan,91 the Supreme Court found state action in enforcement of a 
civil libel suit.92 The Court explained that the civil context of the case 
and application of common law were not dispositive for the state-
action inquiry: “The test is not the form in which state power has 
been applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact 
been exercised.”93 
 
 83. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-13 (2014). 
 84. Id. § 4-1. 
 85. Id. § 52-13. 
 86. One possible argument for this is that the statutes constitute only incidental burdens on 
the rights. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. 
REV. 1175, 1232–33 (1996) (“Although riddled with inconsistencies and exceptions, existing law 
in the areas of free speech, (statutory) free exercise of religion, and privacy appears to recognize 
that an incidental burden on a primary conduct right triggers some form of heightened scrutiny 
if, but only if, the burden is substantial.”). 
 87. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948). 
 88. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 89. Id. at 18. 
 90. E.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964). 
 91. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 92. Id. at 265.  
 93. Id. (citations omitted).  
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Defendants in tort actions can also allege violations of 
constitutional rights to escape tort liability.94 Recently, in Snyder v. 
Phelps,95 the Court held that “[t]he Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment . . . can serve as a defense in state tort suits.”96 The 
decision affirmed the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion that “[i]t is well 
established that tort liability under state law, even in the context of 
litigation between private parties, is circumscribed by the First 
Amendment.”97 
Although the tort jurisprudence concerning state action deals 
primarily with First Amendment free-speech claims, there is no 
reason it should not also apply when the tort action infringes 
Fourteenth Amendment substantive-due-process rights or First 
Amendment intimate-association rights.98 In the speech-claims 
context, the Court has found state action because the common-law 
action executed by a judge has coercively transferred money from one 
party to another due to the content of their speech.99 The state-action 
inquiry is separate from the constitutional-scrutiny analysis.100 
At the very least, torts are more likely to be subject to 
constitutional analysis when they mirror criminal regulation: “What a 
State may not constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal 
 
 94. E.g. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 461 (2011) (holding that the First Amendment 
shielded a religious group that picketed a funeral from tort liability); see also Barbara Rook 
Snyder, Private Motivation, State Action and the Allocation of Responsibility for Fourteenth 
Amendment Violations, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1053, 1086 (1990) (“[A] private party is not 
entitled to have its wishes enforced by the government when such enforcement would be 
unconstitutional. The private motivation in such a case ceases to be private when it becomes the 
basis for governmental action.”). 
 95. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011).  
 96. Id. at 451.  
 97. Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 217 (4th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) (citation 
omitted). 
 98. Civil liability extends otherwise private actions into the public sphere of state action. 
See, e.g., Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive Damages, 84 TEX. L. REV. 105, 134 (2005) 
(“There is no room here for the idea that civil liability is something quite different from a fine; 
there is no purely private aspect.”). 
 99. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964) (stating that civil liability 
counted as state action partially because potential civil liability was one thousand times greater 
than the amount of the fine under the criminal statute). 
 100. Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 527 (1985) 
(“[F]inding state action does not necessarily mean that the private conduct is an impermissible 
violation of rights. Rather, it simply implies that the courts cannot dismiss cases for want of state 
action, but instead must reach the merits.”). 
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statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil law.”101 Thus, just as 
states cannot criminalize sexual conduct between consenting adults, 
the fear of tort damages cannot be used to dissuade people from 
engaging in that same conduct.102 
C. Punitive Damages 
State action is often present when courts grant punitive damages 
in tort.103 In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore104 and State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Campbell,105 for example, 
the Supreme Court extended its due-process jurisprudence to 
encompass constraints on civil damages.106 This precedent indicates 
that private suits for punitive damages could constitute state action. 
By giving private actors power to punish and deter—power usually 
reserved for the state—punitive damages exhibit state action.107 
Some may argue that the constitutional analysis of punitive-
damage awards in alienation of affection and criminal conversation 
should be limited to their possible excessiveness in light of the 
 
 101. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 277. The Court recognized that “[t]he fear of damage awards 
under a rule such as that invoked by the Alabama courts here may be markedly more inhibiting 
than the fear of prosecution under a criminal statute.” Id. (citation omitted).  
 102. See John C. P. Goldberg, Tort Law for Federalists (and the Rest of Us): Private Law in 
Disguise, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 3, 6 n.9 (2004) (“[T]o the extent the result in a particular 
tort case suggests that the state judiciary is presiding over a system of tort law that is functioning 
for all intents and purposes as a regulatory scheme and no longer functioning as a system of 
private law, the state action requirement may also be met.”). 
 103. Eric E. Walker, Note, State Action and Punitive Damages: A New Twist on an Old 
Doctrine, 38 CONN. L. REV. 833, 835 (2006) (“By approaching the recent punitive damage 
award cases from a state action perspective, we see a striking similarity between these recent 
decisions and the theory of state action expounded by the Shelley Court: that judicial decisions 
inject the unmistakable imprimatur of the state, thereby turning an otherwise private or civil 
action into a state action for purposes of constitutional review.”). 
 104. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 105. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 106. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 562 (“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibits a State from imposing a ‘grossly excessive’ punishment on a tortfeasor.” (citation 
omitted)); see also State Farm, 538 U.S. at 426 (“[C]ourts must ensure that the measure of 
punishment is both reasonable and proportionate to the amount of harm to the plaintiff and to 
the general damages recovered.”). 
 107. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Andrew L. Mathews, Why Punitive Damages Are 
Unconstitutional, 53 EMORY L.J. 1, 4 (2004) (“The framework of punitive damages gives us the 
worst of both worlds: Pure public power is vested in the hands of purely private actors, but those 
private actors do not simultaneously assume the constitutional and political restrictions 
traditionally imposed on those who exercise pure public power.”). 
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Gore/State Farm standard.108 This again confuses the constitutional-
infringement analysis with the state-action analysis.109 If punitive 
damages constitute state action, they cannot infringe any 
constitutional rights without meeting a tailoring analysis.110 
Under the above reasoning, the use of punitive damages in 
alienation-of-affection or criminal-conversation judgments constitutes 
state action and warrants constitutional review for its possible 
infringement of any constitutional rights and protections.111 The state 
is directly regulating sexual conduct and intimate association by using 
them as either the starting point to begin enforcing punitive damages 
or as criteria in calculating punitive damages.112 
While the state-action inquiry presents intriguing legal questions, 
a more in-depth analysis is outside the scope of this Note. For present 
purposes, it suffices to presume the presence of state action. That 
presumption in turn raises two main questions: First, do these torts 
infringe any constitutional rights?113 Second, under a heightened level 
of scrutiny, is the state interest behind these tort actions sufficiently 
tailored or related to the means the states have selected through these 
tort actions?114 
III.  CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO ADULTERY 
The kind of conduct that can give rise to liability for alienation of 
affection or criminal conversation—usually sexual intercourse 
 
 108. For that standard, see State Farm, 538 U.S. at 418 (citing Gore’s guideposts as the 
standard applied in the case). 
 109. See supra note 100.  
 110. By utilizing the power of the State to collect damages and punish conduct, ordinary 
people can infringe upon the constitutional rights of others, which should qualify as state action. 
See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 18 (1948) (“[F]rom the time of the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment until the present, it has been the consistent ruling of this Court that the 
action of the States to which the Amendment has reference includes action of state courts and 
state judicial officials.”); Redish & Mathews, supra note 107, at 53 (“[P]rivate plaintiffs seeking 
punitive damages are exercising what amounts to pure public power in a legally coercive 
manner.”). 
 111. Again, this is because punitive damages give powers traditionally held by the State to 
private litigants. See Zipursky, supra note 98, at 170 (“[P]unitive damages give legal recognition 
to a right to be punitive.”). 
 112. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278 (1964) (describing libel law’s 
punitive damages as “a form of regulation that creates hazards to protected freedoms markedly 
greater than those that attend reliance upon the criminal law” (quoting Bantam Books, Inc., 
v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963))).  
 113. See infra Part III.  
 114. See infra Part IV.  
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between consenting adults, and often in a long-term but unmarried 
relationship115—is also conduct that seems to fall within the ambit of 
at least two fundamental constitutional rights: First, especially post-
Lawrence v. Texas,116 the conduct may be protected by Fourteenth 
Amendment substantive due process.117 Second, First Amendment 
intimate-associations rights might protect these relationships.118 This 
Part delves into these two doctrines and attempts to articulate not a 
right to adultery per se, but instead a right to defined sexual conduct 
or intimate relationships. 
The marital context of these torts does present situation-specific 
problems for constitutional-rights analysis. Marriage can theoretically 
be seen as a contract that waives constitutional rights.119 But realizing 
that marriage cannot waive a constitutional right under established 
unconstitutional-conditions doctrine readily dispatches this 
complication.120 
A. The Fourteenth Amendment 
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process protects 
additional rights beyond those guaranteed explicitly by the Bill of 
Rights.121 Although the Court looks to historical practices to 
determine substantive-due-process rights in some contexts, it appears 
that this approach no longer applies in the context of sexual intimacy 
 
 115. Sexual intercourse has to occur for a viable claim of criminal conversation. It is hard to 
accurately generalize about what situations alienation-of-affection suits most often arise out of, 
given that most of the litigation occurs only in the lowest state courts. In my research, I found no 
recent cases in which alienation-of-affections suits were brought against someone who was not 
sexually active with the plaintiff’s spouse. Legal practitioners seem to agree that these claims 
most often involve sex. See, e.g., Julie Scelfo, Heartbreak’s Revenge, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 3, 2006, 
7:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/heartbreaks-revenge-105245 [http://perma.cc/5W8H-
P3EF] (referencing comments from a former chair of the North Carolina Bar’s family-law 
section about how people “file these claims as leverage in divorce and custody disputes”). For a 
discussion of the emerging trends in the application of doctrines governing facial and as-applied 
challenges, see Symposium, The Roberts Court: Distinguishing As-Applied Versus Facial 
Challenges, 36 HASTING CONST. L.Q. 563 (2009).  
 116. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
 117. See infra Part III.A.  
 118. See infra Part III.B. 
 119. See infra Part III.C. 
 120. See infra Part III.C. 
 121. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 593 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing Court precedent in this 
area). 
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and marriage.122 These rights may be infringed if the state action 
affecting them does not exhibit a sufficiently close connection to a 
sufficiently important government purpose.123 
Alienation-of-affection and criminal-conversation suits possibly 
infringe some right to sexual conduct announced by Lawrence. The 
case for the unconstitutionality of alienation-of-affection actions 
based solely on a Fourteenth Amendment right is not 
straightforward. Any facial Fourteenth Amendment challenge to the 
tort based on some kind of Lawrence right to sexual conduct must 
recognize that the claim is based on the “wrongful and malicious 
conduct of the defendant.”124 Any ruling on Fourteenth Amendment 
grounds would have to account for other actions—actions that may 
not be fundamental rights—which could establish the wrongful and 
malicious conduct necessary for an alienation-of-affection claim. In 
most instances, however, alienation-of-affections suits include 
sexually active adulterous relationships.125 Considering criminal-
conversation torts, the case for unconstitutionality is 
straightforward.126 
1. Piecing Together Lawrence.  In Lawrence, the Supreme Court 
invalidated a Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the 
same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct.127 The Court 
held that the Texas statute criminalizing sexual conduct “furthers no 
legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the 
personal and private life of the individual.”128 This decision 
overturned Bowers v. Hardwick,129 wherein the Court had held that 
the Constitution did not protect sodomy.130 The Court based its 
 
 122. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (“Glucksberg did insist that 
liberty under the Due Process Clause must be defined in a most circumscribed manner, with 
central reference to specific historical practices. Yet while that approach may have been 
appropriate for the asserted right there involved (physician-assisted suicide), it is inconsistent 
with the approach this Court has used in discussing other fundamental rights, including marriage 
and intimacy.”). 
 123. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 593 (discussing Court precedent in this area).  
 124. See Bishop v. Glazener, 96 S.E.2d 870, 873 (N.C. 1957) (stating that although “[t]he 
wrongful and malicious conduct of the defendant need not be the sole cause of the alienation of 
affections,” most cases have this conduct as “the controlling or effective cause of alienation”).  
 125. See supra note 115. 
 126. Criminal conversation requires sexual conduct. See supra Part I.B. 
 127. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564, 578. 
 128. Id. at 578.  
 129. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558. 
 130. Id. at 194. 
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holding in Lawrence on Fourteenth Amendment substantive due 
process,131 even though it could have decided the case under the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.132 The Court did 
not announce any clear standard of review,133 instead reaching its 
holding after discussing multiple substantive-due-process and equal-
protection cases,134 and concluding that the dissenting view in Bowers 
“should have been controlling.”135 
So, what exactly did Lawrence hold? Lawrence produced 
confusion, including among some of the most preeminent 
constitutional scholars.136 Lower courts are split on whether Lawrence 
created a fundamental right to private sexual conduct between 
consenting adults.137 Nonetheless, some principles seem reasonably 
clear. Lawrence does not include a right to pederasty, rape, sexual 
assault, bestiality, public sex, or prostitution.138 A minimalist 
 
 131. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564 (“We conclude the case should be resolved by determining 
whether the petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of 
their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution.”).  
 132. See id. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (urging this approach).  
 133. See id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the lack of a standard of review); see also 
Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its 
Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1916 (2004) (noting the lack of an explicit standard in 
Lawrence).  
 134. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564–77. 
 135. Id. at 578. 
 136. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, 
Sexuality, and Marriage, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 29 (describing the Lawrence opinion as 
“remarkably opaque”). 
 137. See Andrew D. Cohen, Note, How the Establishment Clause Can Influence Substantive 
Due Process: Adultery Bans After Lawrence, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 605, 622 n.129 (2010) 
(discussing circuit split on the issue). 
 138. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“The present case does not involve minors. It does not 
involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where 
consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution. . . . The 
case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in 
sexual practices . . . .”). To parse the language, “two adults” and “not involve minors” excludes 
pederasty; “full and mutual consent” and “situated in relationships where consent might not 
easily be refused” excludes rape and sexual assault; “two adults” excludes bestiality; and the last 
two are left to the discerning reader. Regulations on polygamy and bigamy need not be 
addressed at all here because they are not regulations on sexual activity, but instead are 
regulations on marital-relational status and would be analyzed under a similar structure to that 
of same-sex marriage. For a similar analysis, see Ariela R. Dubler, Immoral Purposes: Marriage 
and the Genus of Illicit Sex, 115 YALE L.J. 756, 759–61 (2006). Luckily for Scalia, the majority 
frames its argument in terms of sexual activity between two adults and hence his hypothetical 
laws on masturbation appear safe. See Williams v. Pryor, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1296 (N.D. Ala. 
2002) (“[M]asturbation is not now, nor has it ever been, a crime in any state of the Union.”).   
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interpretation could find some circumscribed right to sexual conduct 
in Lawrence from the Court’s enumeration of sexual practices not at 
issue in the case, combined with its analysis and statement that “the 
Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their 
conduct without intervention of the government.”139 
2. Lawrence Covers Extramarital Sex.  But neither party in 
Lawrence was married, leaving open the possibility that Lawrence did 
not extend to extramarital sexual conduct.140 Some have argued that 
there is a meaningful distinction between rights practiced inside 
marriage and those rights practiced outside of marriage.141 Others 
argue that Lawrence did not include the right to engage in sexual 
conduct that could “injure a person or harm an institution (like 
marriage) that the state may constitutionally protect.”142 
But this view overlooks the possible interpretation that the Court 
is protecting individual conduct;143 specifically, an individual’s right to 
autonomy in certain decisions.144 Other Supreme Court precedent 
may illustrate that individuals indeed possess not only a right to 
engage in private, consensual sexual conduct, but also a right to do so 
regardless of marital status.145 In Griswold v. Connecticut,146 Justice 
 
 139. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (emphasis added); see also Tribe, supra note 133, at 1917 
(“To search for the magic words proclaiming the right protected in Lawrence to be 
‘fundamental,’ and to assume that in the absence of those words mere rationality review 
applied, is to universalize what is in fact only an occasional practice.”).  
 140. However, Justice Scalia lamented that laws regulating adultery would no longer survive 
rational-basis review. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 141. Justice Scalia himself suggested this view in a footnote of the plurality opinion of 
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), a view that Justices O’Connor and Kennedy did 
not join despite joining the plurality opinion. See id. at 127 n.6 (using traditional marriage to 
define parental rights). 
 142. E.g., Dale Carpenter, Is Lawrence Libertarian?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1140, 1164 (2004). 
 143. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the right of privacy means 
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether 
to bear or beget a child.” (citation omitted)); see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205–06 
(1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“In a variety of 
circumstances we have recognized that a necessary corollary of giving individuals freedom to 
choose how to conduct their lives is acceptance of the fact that different individuals will make 
different choices.”). 
 144. See Joseph Blocher, Rights To and Not To, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 761, 800–01 (2012) 
(“[S]ome choice rights essentially become rights to autonomy, whatever the labels—such as 
‘privacy’—under which they do business.”).  
 145. See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 778 (2011) 
BRUTON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/22/2015  1:33 AM 
774 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:755 
Goldberg posited in his concurrence that “if upon a showing of a 
slender basis of rationality, a law outlawing voluntary birth control by 
married persons is valid, then, by the same reasoning, a law requiring 
compulsory birth control also would seem to be valid.”147 Noting this 
absurdity he further stated, “In my view, however, both types of law 
would unjustifiably intrude upon rights of marital privacy which are 
constitutionally protected.”148 Adopting this logic, forbidding sexual 
conduct outside the marriage because of perceived harm to the 
marriage is similar to a law “that mandates sex between spouses 
exactly five times weekly on grounds that anything less hurts the 
marriage. Either the sexual affairs of marriage are a matter of 
personal decision or they are not.”149 The Constitution does not 
protect some idealized concept of marriage, it protects fundamental 
rights. 
Marriage cannot render fundamental rights more or less 
fundamental. In Eisenstadt v. Baird,150 the Court protected “the right 
of the individual, married or single” to make decisions about 
contraception.151 In Roe v. Wade,152 the Court upheld the right of 
women to individually decide whether they wanted to have a child.153 
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,154 the 
Court held that the State could not abridge this right of individual 
choice by requiring a woman to inform her husband of the abortion 
beforehand.155 This was so even though “[i]n many cases in which 
married women do not notify their husbands, the pregnancy is the 
result of an extramarital affair.”156 In Obergefell v. Hodges,157 the 
 
(“Lawrence was ultimately not a group-based equality case about gays, but rather a universal 
liberty case about the right of all consenting adults to engage in sexual intimacy in the privacy of 
their homes.”). 
 146. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 147. Id. at 497 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 148. Id.  
 149. Martin J. Siegel, For Better or for Worse: Adultery, Crime & the Constitution, 30 J. FAM. 
L. 45, 73 (1992) (discussing Goldberg’s concurrence in Griswold). For an argument that there is 
also a correlative right not to engage in sexual intimacy, see Blocher, supra note 144, at 777 
(“Presumably there is also a right not to be sexually intimate . . . .”).  
 150. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 151. Id. at 453. 
 152. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  
 153. Id. at 166. 
 154. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 155. Id. at 893–95.  
 156. Id. at 892.  
 157. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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Supreme Court held that the state could not abridge a person’s right 
to choose a spouse of the same sex despite arguments that “allowing 
same-sex couples to wed will harm marriage as an institution by 
leading to fewer opposite-sex marriages.”158 It is the ability to choose 
that grounds these rights in the Constitution.159 
These precedents illustrate that the marital context alone cannot 
limit fundamental rights. Individuals can make decisions about 
contraception regardless of marital status.160 Individuals can decide 
whether or not to bring a childwhom may be a product of an 
extramarital affairinto this world without the consent of their 
spouse.161 Individuals can decide whom they want to marry even if 
others claim it will harm the institution of marriage.162 Ultimately, 
marital status cannot suddenly negate the constitutionally granted 
power to make individual decisions in sexual matters.163 
3. Lawrence Covers Fleeting Relationships.  Furthermore, the 
Lawrence right is not simply about advancing meaningful 
relationships, but also “the substantive due process right to engage in 
consensual intimate conduct in the home free from government 
intrusion.”164 In Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle,165 the Fifth Circuit 
cited Lawrence to strike down a Texas statute that criminalized the 
 
 158. Id. at 2606. 
 159. See, e.g., id. at 2599 (“[T]he right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in 
the concept of individual autonomy . . . . Like choices concerning contraception, family 
relationships, procreation, and childrearing, all of which are protected by the Constitution, 
decisions concerning marriage are among the most intimate that an individual can make.”). 
 160. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“[W]hatever the rights of the 
individual to access to contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same for the unmarried and 
the married alike.”).  
 161. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 895 (invalidating Pennsylvania’s spousal notification provision).  
 162. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2606–07 (rejecting the argument that “allowing same-sex 
couples to wed will harm marriage as an institution by leading to fewer opposite-sex 
marriages”). 
 163. See C. Quince Hopkins, The Supreme Court’s Family Law Doctrine Revisited: Insights 
from Social Science on Family Structures and Kinship Change in the United States, 13 CORNELL 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 431, 472 (2004) (“[T]he Court’s regulation of adult non-marital intimate 
relationships in Eisenstadt and Lawrence reveals a court willing to expand its notion of 
Constitutional protection of conduct within intimate adult relationships that do not fit within 
the blood, marriage and adoption triangle.”); see also Gabrielle Viator, Note, The Validity of 
Criminal Adultery Prohibitions After Lawrence v. Texas, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 837, 853 (2006) 
(“Arguably, the decision of an individual to commit adultery is . . . sufficiently similar to other 
personal choices regarding marriage, family, procreation, contraception, and sexuality . . . .”). 
 164. Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 744 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 165. Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008). 
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selling, advertising, giving, or lending of sex toys.166 Although some 
have argued eloquently for the benefits of sex toys in furthering 
relationships,167 it is undeniable that sex toys are commonly “used for 
masturbatory purposes”168 that do not further meaningful 
relationships.169 Lawrence cannot be about a right to sexual conduct 
only in committed relationships because the couple in Lawrence 
“w[as] not in a long-term committed relationshipif they were 
involved at all.”170 Lawrence spurns the idea that moral opprobrium 
alone justifies curtailing sexual conduct. 
The deeper answer is that Lawrence, in all its emotional, social, and 
legal complexity, is a reflection of life itself. People do indeed lead 
complex lives. They fall in love, cheat, lie, drink. None of this makes 
them any less entitled, as Justice Kennedy put it, to “respect for 
their private lives.” If it were otherwise, there would be very few 
peoplegay or straightentitled to liberty.171 
Morality ceases to be a legitimate state purpose when it infringes 
on the constitutional rights of others.172 Lawrence “delink[ed] sex and 
marriage in a continuation of the project [the Court] began with 
Eisenstadt.”173 In short, “sex between two unmarried individuals is as 
private and important an endeavor as sex between an unmarried and 
 
 166. Id. at 740–41, 746. But see Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1236 (11th 
Cir. 2004) (reversing the district court and holding that Lawrence did not create a right and 
upholding a similar Alabama statute).  
 167. One such argument comes from the district court’s factual record in Williams v. Pryor, 
220 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (N.D. Ala. 2002), which devoted an entire paragraph to how “‘sexual aids 
help in the revitalization of potentially failing marital relations,’ and that the use of sexual 
devices is recommended in ‘therapy for couples who are having sexual problems in their 
marriage.’” Id. at 1296, 1305.  
 168. Id. at 1296.  
 169. The conduct may further other autonomy goals: “[I]ndividuals often derive satisfaction, 
self-esteem, and self-possession, among other values, through masturbation, either as a 
complement to engaging in sex acts with other people or in lieu of such interactions.” Laura A. 
Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex In and Out of Intimacy, 59 EMORY L.J. 809, 837 (2010) 
(footnote omitted). 
 170. DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS 280 
(2012). 
 171. Id. at 281 (footnote omitted). 
 172. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (“Many who deem same-sex 
marriage to be wrong reach that conclusion based on decent and honorable religious or 
philosophical premises, and neither they nor their beliefs are disparaged here. But when that 
sincere, personal opposition becomes enacted law and public policy, the necessary consequence 
is to put the imprimatur of the State itself on an exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes 
those whose own liberty is then denied.”). 
 173. Dubler, supra note 138, at 810. 
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a married person, between persons married to each other, or between 
persons married to others.”174 
Even if the Lawrence opinion lends itself more to some kind of 
relational underpinning for a right to sexual conduct,175 no workable 
regime exists by which the government could legitimately distinguish 
between meaningful relationships and one-night stands.176 What 
begins in what many deem moral depravity or pure lust may lead to 
lasting long-term relationships, or it may not.177 If Lawrence was about 
sexual conduct furthering meaningful relationships, then how could 
the Court conclude that the case “[did] not involve whether the 
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that 
homosexual persons seek to enter”?178 Most likely, Lawrence struck 
down the sodomy statute at issue in recognition of this regulatory 
impossibility.179 
Nonetheless, if Lawrence is about some right of “meaningful” 
sexual conduct, then it in some measure “challenges the idea that 
marriage can be a proxy for legal sex, and strengthens the notion that 
constitutional privacy rights concern not the relationship of marriage 
but instead the sexual autonomy to enter into many kinds of 
relationships.”180 “The Constitution promises liberty to all within its 
reach, a liberty that includes certain specific rights that allow persons, 
within a lawful realm, to define and express their identity.”181 In that 
 
 174. Note, Constitutional Barriers to Civil and Criminal Restrictions on Pre- and 
Extramarital Sex, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1660, 1674 (1991).  
 175. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (“When sexuality finds overt 
expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a 
personal bond that is more enduring.”). 
 176. See Siegel, supra note 149, at 78 (“It is difficult, both theoretically and practically, to 
single out the sexual contacts two people may have from the rest of their relationship—to 
criminalize the one and constitutionally protect as fundamental the other.”) 
 177. For example, the adulterous parties in the Hutelmyer case, see supra notes 10–17, 
eventually married once the husband finalized his divorce. Angela Jones, Buck County Native’s 
Unique Suit Became a Movie, THE MORNING CALL (Aug. 25, 1999), http://articles.mcall.
com/1999-08-25/features/3262512_1_joe-hutelmyer-affection-alienation [http://perma.cc/EM9Y-
7AYB]. 
 178. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 179. See id. at 567 (“The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or 
not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without 
being punished as criminals.”).  
 180. Kerry Abrams & Peter Brooks, Marriage as a Message: Same-Sex Couples and the 
Rhetoric of Accidental Procreation, 21 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 19 (2009) (citing Lawrence, 539 
U.S. at 567). 
 181. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015). 
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way, First Amendment intimate-association cases inform the 
inquiry.182 
B. First Amendment Intimate Association 
Alienation-of-affection and criminal-conversation actions may 
also infringe the First Amendment, which protects an individual’s 
right to freely associate with others.183 The Supreme Court has 
recognized two ways that the Constitution protects freedom of 
association.184 First, “choices to enter into and maintain certain 
intimate human relationships must be secured against undue intrusion 
by the State because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding 
the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme.”185 
Second, “the Court has recognized a right to associate for the purpose 
of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment.”186 
Adulterous relationships possibly implicate both protections,187 but 
the case is much more compelling for the first.188 If adulterous 
relationships are protected intimate associations, then regulation of 
those relationships must pass a heightened standard of constitutional 
scrutiny.189 
1. Adultery and Intimate Association.  The Court has historically 
protected relationships “that attend [to] the creation and sustenance 
of a family.”190 Although adulterous relationships may seem to fall 
outside this protection, nothing expressly forbids constitutional 
protection of them.191 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees192 established the factors 
 
 182. Paul M. Secunda, Lawrence’s Quintessential Millian Moment and Its Impact on the 
Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions, 50 VILL. L. REV. 117, 132 (2005). 
 183. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 918–19 (1982) (“The First 
Amendment similarly restricts the ability of the State to impose liability on an individual solely 
because of his association with another.”). 
 184. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617 (1984). 
 185. Id. at 617–18. 
 186. Id. at 618.  
 187. See Siegel, supra note 149, at 77 (“The act of having an extramarital affair involves, to 
some degree at least, both types of association.”). 
 188. See infra Part III.B.1.  
 189. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623 (“Infringements on that right may be justified by regulations 
adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be 
achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 190. Id. at 619.  
 191. Id. at 620 (“[There is] a broad range of human relationships that may make greater or 
lesser claims to constitutional protection from particular incursions by the State.”); see also Bd. 
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relevant to determining whether the Constitution protects the 
relationship, which include “size, purpose, policies, selectivity, 
congeniality, and other characteristics that in a particular case may be 
pertinent.”193 
In Marcum v. McWhorter,194 the Sixth Circuit held that 
adulterous relationships were not constitutionally protected.195 The 
adulterer argued that his adulterous relationship met the Roberts 
factors because the relationship “was relatively smalljust the two of 
them; highly selective in the decision to begin and maintain the 
affiliation; and others were secluded from the relationship.”196 The 
court held that “[a]lthough these factors may weigh in favor of a 
finding of a protected relationship, we find that the adulterous nature 
of the relationship does not portray a relationship of the most 
intimate variety afforded protection under the Constitution.”197 But 
the court in Marcum incorrectly blended the rights analysis with the 
scrutiny analysis.198 
Adulterous relationships represent intimate associations that 
arguably satisfy the factors enumerated in Roberts.199 Affairs are 
usually between two people, making them small and selective.200 The 
purpose of affairs is to exercise intimate emotional and sexual 
autonomy, and “[t]his is no more or less true if the partners happen to 
be single, married to each other or married to third parties.”201 An 
adulterous relationship serves similar goals to that of any other 
 
of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987) (“Of course, we have 
not held that constitutional protection is restricted to relationships among family members.”). 
 192. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
 193. Id. at 620; see also id. (“As a general matter, only relationships with these sorts of 
qualities are likely to reflect the considerations that have led to an understanding of freedom of 
association as an intrinsic element of personal liberty.”). 
 194. Marcum v. McWhorter, 308 F.3d 635 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 195. Id. at 643. 
 196. Id. at 640. 
 197. Id.  
 198. Siegel, supra note 149, at 77; see also id. (“[D]etermining whether an adulterous affair is 
or is not an intimate association hinges on the characteristics of that relationship, not on the 
correctness, moral or otherwise, of the relationship.”). 
 199. See Cohen, supra note 137, at 637–38 (“[A]n adulterous affair can satisfy most of the 
Roberts factors, particularly if the relationship is more than a casual fling.”). 
 200. See Siegel, supra note 149, at 78 (“[I]t is usually very small, selective and 
secluded . . . .”). 
 201. Id. at 77–78.  
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associational relationship.202 Likewise, “experiencing sexual pleasure, 
without regard to relationship or other end goals, can be an important 
aspect of individual identity and self-expression.”203 Restrictions on 
sexual conduct diminish a person’s expression of identity.204 
Adulterous relationships can meet the test for intimate associations, 
but they are intimate associations that compete with marriage205 as an 
intimate association. To what degree, then, should the state be able to 
decide which relationship should take preference? And if the state 
should decide, what factors should it consider?206 
2. Marriage and Adultery as Competing Intimate Associations.  
There is no categorical answer, but “intimate relations may not be 
micromanaged or overtaken by the state.”207 Marriages, like 
adulterous relationships, often meet the test of intimate association. 
Yet marriages do not have to meet that test. Marriage is about a right 
of choice: “[T]he freedom to leave gives added meaning to the 
decision to stay.”208 Any interest the state has in protecting one 
intimate association from another must be weighed against the 
alternatives the state has to protect the the marriage.209 
Furthermore, to say that marriage is an intimate association 
presumes that parties have a right to choose to engage in that 
intimate association.210 The torts of criminal conversation and 
 
 202. Id. at 78 (“[T]he adulterous relationship does foster diversity just as any unique 
association[] do[es]. And it can play a crucial role in providing emotional sustenance and 
opportunities for self-definition.”). 
 203. Rosenbury & Rothman, supra note 169, at 836. 
 204. Blocher, supra note 144, at 806 (noting that constraining “the ability to engage in sexual 
intimacy therefore effectively restraints [sic] a person’s ability to be who they are”). 
 205. This assumes that the marriage is not polyamorous or open. 
 206. Relationships outside of marriage have worth. Otherwise, “regardless of any other 
factors that might be considered in assessing whether a relationship should be afforded 
constitutional protection, the only relevant factor in determining whether a relationship should 
be afforded constitutional protection . . . is whether the relationship can be deemed adulterous.” 
Marcum v. McWhorter, 308 F.3d 635, 643 (6th Cir. 2002) (Clay, J., concurring). I agree with 
Judge Clay’s ultimate conclusion that “the adulterous nature of the relationship alone should 
not be dispositive.” Id. at 644.  
 207. Tribe, supra note 133, at 1922. 
 208. Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 638 (1980). 
 209. Any alternate view of associations removes the choice aspect of a marriage. “Wives are 
not property. Neither are husbands. The love and affection of a human being who is devoted to 
another human being is not susceptible to theft. There are simply too many intangibles which 
defy the concept that love is property.” Hunt v. Hunt, 309 N.W.2d 818, 821 (S.D. 1981). 
 210. Karst, supra note 208, at 633 (noting that “the value of commitment is fully realizable 
only in an atmosphere of freedom to choose whether a particular association will be fleeting or 
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alienation of affection focus on interlopers.211 These torts pretend that 
the availability of partners for adultery is the only thing affecting the 
choice to stay in a marriage when, in reality, “[d]ecisions about 
whether to marry and raise children are based on many personal, 
romantic, and practical considerations.”212 If the only thing keeping a 
spouse sexually or emotionally monogamous is lack of a willing third-
party participant for adultery, then the association has little 
meaning.213 Still, states can seek to protect licensed relationships 
through tort law. What role tort law can constitutionally occupy to 
balance these competing relationships requires a tailoring analysis.214 
C. Marital Waiver of Constitutional Rights 
Some scholars argue that marriage is a contract and, as part of 
that contract, spouses may waive their right to extramarital sex or 
extramarital intimate associations.215 This is incorrect in two regards. 
First, conditioning the grant and recognition of marital rights on the 
surrender of other fundamental rights implicates heightened scrutiny 
under an unconstitutional-conditions analysis.216 Second, even if it is a 
permissible argument, alienation of affection and criminal 
conversation also punish the interloper, who is not party to the 
contract. Any analogy to tortious interference with contract217 must 
also fail because after a normal contractual breach “the plaintiff can 
 
enduring”); see also Siegel, supra note 149, at 76 (“Our constitutional jurisprudence, however, 
should be confident, if the states cannot be, that a marriage’s privacy and autonomy are the best 
routes to safeguarding liberty and pluralism. This is no less true when the power to choose, as it 
inevitably will, results in bad choices.”). 
 211. See supra Part I.  
 212. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015).  
 213. Cf. Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and Bargaining 
for Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1993 (2010) (“Family law is a licensing scheme, 
necessary for formation (marriage) and dissolution (divorce), but with little to say, or do, in 
between.”).  
 214. See infra Part IV. 
 215. See, e.g., William R. Corbett, A Somewhat Modest Proposal to Prevent Adultery and 
Save Families: Two Old Torts Looking for A New Career, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 985, 1033–34 (2001) 
(outlining the argument).  
 216. See, e.g., Note, supra note 174, at 1675 (“Marriage provides many state-sponsored 
benefits: adultery statutes condition these gains upon renunciation of the constitutionally 
protected freedom to have sex with unmarried individuals. Such conditions are unconstitutional 
unless justified by a compelling state interest. By conditioning benefits upon the surrender of 
fundamental freedoms, adultery laws implicate these rights.” (footnotes omitted)); see also 
Siegel, supra note 149, at 75 (discussing similar arguments). 
 217. See, e.g., Thomas v. Siddiqui, 869 S.W.2d 740, 742 (Mo. 1994) (en banc) (Robertson, J., 
dissenting) (claiming the two torts “are species of the tort genus interference with contract”). 
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sue not only the third party but also the other party to the contract. In 
alienation of affection and criminal conversation the other party to 
the ‘contract’ is the plaintiff’s spouse who . . . may not be subject to a 
suit by the marital partner.”218 Furthermore, tortious interference with 
contract requires that the third party know he is violating the contract 
of others,219 whereas alienation of affection and criminal conversation 
do not require this knowledge.220 
IV.  SURVIVING SCRUTINY 
The level of scrutiny applied depends on the possible rights these 
torts infringe, and the jurisprudence discussed in Part III is not known 
for its clear standards.221 Whatever the precise standard, it is most 
likely “a standard of review that lies between strict scrutiny and 
rational basis.”222 Therefore, state regulation of adulterous actions and 
relationships should receive some form of heightened scrutiny.223 This 
Part does not suggest a concrete scrutiny test for the rights discussed 
herein, but instead discusses the general balance between the possible 
state interests and means used to achieve those interests. This Part 
considers each of the historical justifications224 for these torts in turn: 
protecting marital morality,225 deterring harmful conduct,226 and 
 
 218. Hoye v. Hoye, 824 S.W.2d 422, 426 (Ky. 1992) (citation omitted). 
 219. See, e.g., Ullmannglass v. Oneida, Ltd., 927 N.Y.S.2d 702, 705 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) 
(“[T]o sustain a claim for tortious interference with a contract, it must be established that a valid 
contract existed which a third party knew about . . . .” (quoting Clearmont Prop., LLC v. Eisner, 
58 A.D.3d 1052, 1055 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009))). 
 220. See supra Part I.  
 221. See, e.g., Secunda, supra note 182, at 128 (“[D]ivining the proper judicial standard of 
review from the Lawrence majority is rendered difficult by the exceedingly enigmatic nature of 
the opinion.”). 
 222. Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 56 (1st Cir. 2008); see also Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 
527 F.3d 806, 816 (9th Cir. 2008) (“We cannot reconcile what the Supreme Court did in 
Lawrence with the minimal protections afforded by traditional rational basis review.”).  
 223. For instance, in discussing the constitutionality of criminal adultery provisions, one 
scholar argued that the State should only be able to criminalize adultery “after demonstrating a 
compelling purpose for doing so in the least restrictive terms.” Siegel, supra note 149, at 69. 
Considering Lawrence and the intimate-association analysis together is warranted because 
“[a]lthough the 2003 Supreme Court Lawrence v. Texas decision did not use the phrase 
‘intimate association’ or address intimate [association, it may] provide critical guidance for 
future intimate association cases and may be read as a type of intimate association case itself.” 
Nancy Catherine Marcus, The Freedom of Intimate Association in the Twenty First Century, 16 
GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 269, 299 (2006).  
 224. See supra Part I.C. 
 225. See infra Part IV.A. 
 226. See infra Part IV.B. 
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compensating227 for harm caused by adulterous actions. Existing tort 
frameworks suggest an alternative to alienation of affection and 
criminal conversation that may hew more closely to the interests that 
these torts claim to serve.228 
A. Tort Law and Morality 
1. The Transformation of Morality’s Role in Law.  It seems 
morality plays a constitutionally questionable role in regulating 
sexuality and marital choices.229 This logic should extend to tort law as 
well.230 Morality doubtlessly seeps into jury deliberations of what 
embodies community standards, outrageous conduct, and other tort 
concepts.231 Tort law attempts to compensate victims, deter harmful 
behavior, and normatively “encourage the development of a society 
in which people behave responsibly toward one another.”232 Any 
higher level of scrutiny above rational-basis review entails looking at 
those interests instead of maintaining the actions on the tenuous basis 
that they serve some community interest in morality.233 The 
 
 227. See infra Part IV.C. 
 228. See infra Part IV.D. 
 229. See, e.g., Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 745 (5th Cir. 2008) (“These 
interests in ‘public morality’ cannot constitutionally sustain the statute after Lawrence.”); see 
also supra note 176. 
 230. See Marcus, supra note 223, at 305 (“In Lawrence, a solid majority of the Court 
consequently recognized that the broader constitutional traditions of protecting the autonomy, 
equal rights and liberty of its diverse citizenry supersede more narrow traditions reflected in the 
moral prejudices of even a majority of the populace.”). 
 231. Indeed, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is predicated on the 
community sense of morality. See, e.g., Banks v. Fritsch, 39 S.W.3d 474, 480 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001) 
(noting that for conduct to be sufficient for an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim it 
must be “so outrageous and intolerable as to offend generally accepted standards of 
morality and decency”). 
 232. ROBERT F. COCHRAN JR. & ROBERT M. ACKERMAN, LAW AND COMMUNITY: THE 
CASE OF TORTS 230 (2004). The normative function works by “vindicat[ing] not only the victim 
but others in society who behave in an appropriate manner and reinforc[ing] standards of 
acceptable behavior.” Id. Putting aside the authors’ legitimate doubts that the tort system serves 
any of these social functions efficiently, any normative function based on the positive 
reinforcement others get from tort enforcement can be viewed as a positive correlative of 
deterrence. Thus, by confirming societal values, tort law affirms socially beneficial behavior. 
 233. See Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1112 (2004) (“By 
finding that morality alone cannot justify a prohibition, . . . a state must now demonstrate some 
other rationale for such laws, presumably some form of objectively harmful effects.”); see also 
Viator, supra note 163, at 855 (“Thus, after Lawrence it would seem the promotion of public 
morality could no longer justify the criminal prohibition of adultery.”). 
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community-morality rationale must be yanked down from the 
ethereal realm and tethered to tort law’s concrete functions. 
Lawrence may symbolize at least one time when the Court took 
this view on morality. Professor Cass Sunstein connects the Court’s 
decision in Lawrence with “the old common law idea of desuetude. 
According to that concept, laws that are hardly ever enforced are 
said, by courts, to have lapsed, simply because they lack public 
support.”234 The lack of public support or use does not evidence a lack 
of moral acceptability for the action, but instead reflects the belief 
that state action is not a legitimate medium to regulate the conduct.235 
Sunstein explains that this desuetude argument cannot be 
freestanding, but must instead hinge on “whether an interest has 
some kind of constitutional status.”236 Sunstein argues that the “Court 
must have concluded that as a matter of principle, the right to engage 
in same-sex relations had a special status in light of the Court’s 
precedents taken along with emerging public convictions—and that 
the moral arguments that supported the ban were no longer sufficient 
to justify it.”237 
Expanding this argument to interpret alienation of affection and 
criminal conversation as examples of a Lawrence-type desuetude 
necessitating abolition or constraint requires an evaluation of when 
this desuetude analysis would “be triggered.”238 One possibility is that 
the desuetude analysis is triggered when few states allow these actions 
and such litigation is rare.239 At the time of Lawrence, thirteen states 
still criminalized sodomy.240 By this count, alienation of affection and 
 
 234. Sunstein, supra note 136, at 49–50 (footnote omitted).  
 235. Sunstein’s argument discusses criminal adultery provisions: 
The difficulty here is that in the context of adultery, criminal prosecutions are 
extremely unusual, at least as rare as criminal prosecutions for sodomy. There is a 
good argument that criminal prosecutions, in this context, are inconsistent with 
emerging social values. This is not because adultery is thought to be morally 
acceptable; it is not. It is because adultery is not thought to be a proper basis for the 
use of the criminal law.  
Id. at 65–66. In the same way that the declining presence of both adultery laws and prosecutions 
evidence this in the criminal-law context, the declining validity and use of alienation-of-affection 
and criminal-conversation actions among the states would evidence this value in the civil 
context. Admittedly, Sunstein does not reach this argument, and in a footnote posits that civil 
disabilities such as employment discrimination may be constitutionally valid, even if criminal 
restrictions would not be. Id. at 66 n.178. 
 236. Id. at 51. 
 237. Id. at 51–52.  
 238. See id. at 54 (explaining when this desuetude analysis would “be triggered”). 
 239. Id.  
 240. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003). 
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criminal conversation are an even more compelling case for a 
desuetude abolition with only five and four states, respectively, 
allowing the actions.241 The Lawrence sodomy statutes were rarely 
enforced before they were abolished.242 Most of the states that still 
allow alienation of affection or criminal conversation have few, if any, 
recent suits;243 expressly declare the suits to be against public policy;244 
or severely restrain recovery in the suits.245 
But the desuetude argument is not a clear winner in every 
state.246 In North Carolina, these suits are still valid and prevalent. For 
example, some estimates put the number of alienation-of-affection 
and criminal-conversation suits filed in North Carolina each year 
around two hundred.247 Their prevalence in North Carolina suggests 
that the torts may serve as legitimate mediums to deter certain 
behavior and compensate the harm adultery causes. 
Nonetheless, the conduct that gives rise to the alienation-of-
affection and criminal-conversation actions is subject to constitutional 
analysis.248 Lawrence and First Amendment law suggest that moral 
disapproval of adultery alone cannot serve as a legitimate interest in 
constitutional analysis.249 To understand what interests suffice for 
constitutionally permissible regulation depends upon understanding 




 241. See supra notes 32–37, 42–45, and accompanying text. 
 242. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573 (“The State of Texas admitted in 1994 that as of 
that date it had not prosecuted anyone under those circumstances.” (citation omitted)). 
 243. See supra notes 32–37, 42–45, and accompanying text. 
 244. See, e.g., supra note 32 (explaining how a New Mexico court has said that the tort 
alienation of affection violates the state’s public policy). 
 245. Until July 21, 2015, Illinois had statutory constraints on damages for alienation-of-
affection and criminal-conversation torts. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1 to 5/7 (2010) (repealed 
by Act of July 21, 2015, Pub. Act 099-0090, art. I (effective Jan. 1, 2016)); id. 50/1 to 50/7 (same). 
 246. See Sunstein, supra note 136, at 54–55 (“Certainly the standard desuetude idea cannot 
be invoked in a state in which the law in question is actively enforced.”)  
 247. See Browder, supra note 2 (“Ditched spouses file about 200 lawsuits each year in North 
Carolina—187 in 2012, 199 in 2011 and 205 in 2010.”). 
 248. See supra Part III.  
 249. That the choice to engage in adultery may not be one that society condones should not 
affect the existence of the liberty interest as “[a]n individual can invoke a right to constitutional 
protection when he or she is harmed, even if the broader public disagrees and even if the 
legislature refuses to act.” See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015). 
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2. The Transformation of Marriage’s Role in Law.  The State 
continues to regulate marriage and, to the extent that adultery harms 
marriage and the parties to it, the State has an interest in regulating 
adultery.250 Assuming that marriage is a beneficial institution, adultery 
works a personal harm against the nonadulterous spouse and possibly 
against any children of the marriage.251 Nevertheless, marriage does 
not serve the same purpose it has always served: “Historians have 
observed a marked difference in the cultural purpose of marriage in 
the past two centuries: the rise of companionate marriage, in which 
spouses are expected to satisfy each others’ emotional needs.”252 The 
constitutional justifications for protecting marriage must evolve with 
the changing definition of marriage.253 Marriage is now more about 
personal emotional fulfillment and companionship.254 Viewing 
marriage as personal emotional fulfillment flies in the face of many 
traditional justifications for marriage.255 This does not mean the 
concept of family has “dissolved. . . . It is simply a demand for a more 
elastic definition of legitimate marriage.”256 This elasticity means that 
marriage “has become less tethered to procreation and more bound 
 
 250. See Cohen, supra note 137, at 633 (“Accordingly, to the extent that adultery is an act 
that causes harm to the institution of marriage, or to individuals involved in that institution (e.g., 
spouses and children), the state’s interest in banning adultery is at least facially legitimate and 
possibly compelling.”). 
 251. Sunstein, supra note 136, at 65. But see Phyllis Coleman, Who’s Been Sleeping in My 
Bed? You and Me, and the State Makes Three, 24 IND. L. REV. 399, 411–12 (1991) (noting that a 
marriage may already be irreparably harmed by the time a spouse decides to commit adultery 
and “many spouses report that having an affair actually strengthened their marriages”). Harm 
to children is an entirely different question. Divorce and extramarital affairs may harm children 
less than conventional wisdom suggests. See E. MAVIS HETHERINGTON & JOHN KELLY, FOR 
BETTER OR FOR WORSE: DIVORCE RECONSIDERED 228–30 (2002) (discussing studies on the 
matter); see also Martha Albertson Fineman, Progress and Progression in Family Law, 2004 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 15 (same).  
 252. Abrams & Brooks, supra note 180, at 10. 
 253. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2595 (“The ancient origins of marriage confirm its 
centrality, but it has not stood in isolation from developments in law and society. The history of 
marriage is one of both continuity and change. That institution—even as confined to opposite-
sex relations—has evolved over time.”). 
 254. See id. at 2600 (noting that marriage “offers the hope of companionship and 
understanding and assurance that while both still live there will be someone to care for the 
other”). 
 255. See Abrams & Brooks, supra note 180, at 10 (“This [view of marriage] is a highly 
personal, individualistic view of marriage where the couple’s personal desires take precedence 
over the needs of the individuals’ fathers to control their property, their extended families to 
create alliances, or the community’s need to discipline sexuality.”). 
 256. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, PRIVATE LIVES: FAMILIES, INDIVIDUALS, AND THE LAW 
11 (2004).  
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up in fulfillment.”257 This definition of marriage would not conform to 
the traditional justifications for alienation-of-affection and criminal-
conversation torts258: “This most recent version of family life puts 
particular pressure on marriage to be fulfilling.”259 Marriage “has 
shifted in the last two centuries from being fundamentally concerned 
with community and the individual’s role within the community to 
being concerned with the individual’s self-actualization through the 
creation of family ties.”260 Nonetheless, it remains true that “[c]hoices 
about marriage shape an individual’s destiny.”261 
Sexual relationships that precede marriage reflect this changing 
view of how an individual constructs romantic relationships.262 The 
law undeniably impacts identity through regulating sexual conduct 
and relationships.263 The State must locate the harm it is trying to 
prevent or deter more precisely to avoid unconstitutionally infringing 
this right.264 
B. Tort Law and Deterrence 
Deterrence may serve counterproductive goals. Deterrence 
cannot be seen as a means to fix a broken marriage. What’s more, 
these actions may cause further harm to any existing marriage.265 
These suits “are almost exclusively brought after the marriage is 
 
 257. Abrams & Brooks, supra note 180, at 11. Procreation has never been the sole basis for 
legally recognized marriage in the United States. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601 (“An ability, 
desire, or promise to procreate is not and has not been a prerequisite for a valid marriage in any 
State. . . . [I]t cannot be said the Court or the States have conditioned the right to marry on the 
capacity or commitment to procreate.”).  
 258. For a discussion of these traditional justifications, see supra Part I.C.  
 259. Abrams & Brooks, supra note 180, at 10. 
 260. Id. at 13. 
 261. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599. 
 262. Lawrence provides an example where “the relationship was about gratifying personal 
commitments and desires, not about claiming public rights or entitlements.” Dubler, supra note 
138, at 760. 
 263. See id. at 765 (“[I]n the past and the present—legal notions of sexual illicitness shape 
people’s intimate identities and their chosen forms of erotic expression . . . .”). 
 264. For an example of this type of exercise, see Deana Pollard Sacks, Snyder v. Phelps, The 
Supreme Court’s Speech-Tort Jurisprudence, and Normative Considerations, 120 YALE L.J. 
ONLINE 193, 194–95 (2010) (“In Sullivan, the Court reconciled defamation liability with the 
First Amendment by tailoring the elements of the plaintiff’s prima facie case in an attempt to 
find the optimal balance of rights to protect both personal interests and freedom of speech.”).  
 265. In discussing criminal conversation, one court noted that it “may even be 
counterproductive if it is used for vindictive purposes by a spouse whose marriage has failed for 
reasons attributable to the fault of that spouse.” Norton v. Macfarlane, 818 P.2d 8, 17 (Utah 
1991). 
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either legally dissolved or irretrievably broken. Revenge, not 
reconciliation, is the [sic] often the primary motive.”266 Moreover, the 
suits require the plaintiff to “publicly acknowledg[e] the intimate 
details that led to the breakdown of the marriage. The necessarily 
adversarial positions taken in litigation over intensely personal and 
private matters does not serve as a useful means of preserving the 
marriage.”267 
These tort actions do not deter harm to the affected marriage, 
but instead serve to deter harm to other marriages.268 The argument 
for deterrence boils down to a simple formulation: “Given that the 
outsider is likely to have other options that do not carry all the risks 
associated with the married person, the additional risk of financial 
liability may deter the outsider.”269 How can tort actions deter harmful 
conduct when the actions do not require the defendant to intend or 
even be reasonably aware that she is causing harm to the marriage?270 
Moreover, it is possible that these torts will not deter a majority 
of spontaneous adulterous behavior because “the nature of the 
activities underlying criminal conversation [and most alienation of 
affection cases], that is sexual activity, are not such that the risk of 
damages would likely be a deterrent.”271 Adultery is often unplanned, 
and a third party does not contemplate civil damages272 as a possible 
consequence of her conduct.273 If adulterers make decisions based on 
passion and do not weigh possible tort damages as a consequence of 
 
 266. Helsel v. Noellsch, 107 S.W.3d 231, 233 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (citations omitted). 
 267. Id. (citations omitted). 
 268. The best these torts can do is compensate affected parties. See, e.g., Nelson v. Jacobsen, 
669 P.2d 1207, 1216 (Utah 1983) (“Similarly, a suit for alienation of affections does not attempt 
to ‘preserve’ or ‘protect’ a marriage from interference, but only to compensate a spouse who has 
suffered loss and injury to his or her marital relationship through the intentional interference of 
a third party.”). 
 269. Corbett, supra note 215, at 1017. 
 270. States that judicially abolished the actions note this paradox. See, e.g., Fundermann v. 
Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790, 791–92 (Iowa 1981) (“[I]t is folly to hope any longer that a married 
person who has become inclined to philander can be preserved within an affectionate marriage 
by the threat of an alienation suit. If we did pretend that a would-be paramour would be thereby 
dissuaded, a substitute is likely to be readily found.”). 
 271. Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 871, 875 (Idaho 1994). 
 272. See Batchelor, supra note 40, at 1937 (“Many plaintiffs only become aware of the cause 
of action when they consult a family law practitioner.”). 
 273. See, e.g., O’Neil v. Schuckardt, 733 P.2d 693, 698 (Idaho 1986) (“The unplanned nature 
of the tort, at least where sexual activities are involved, makes the threat of any damage suit 
unlikely to deter the culpable conduct that has allegedly interfered with the marriage.”); see also 
Batchelor, supra note 40, at 1934 (“Courts and legal commentators generally agree that criminal 
conversation does not deter adultery.”). 
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their behavior,274 then the State does not have a legitimate deterrence 
interest in preserving these torts. 
Even if the rationale is that the torts deter the conduct itself—
regardless of intent or ex ante knowledge of these torts—this 
argument overlooks that these torts’ “deterrent effect, which was 
never great, is today swamped by the costs and uncertainties that they 
impose on the judicial system.”275 With the possibility for millions in 
damages, parties often bring or threaten to bring criminal-
conversation or alienation-of-affection claims to extort concessions 
out of an opposing party in divorce proceedings.276 Some have even 
argued that the possibility of legal liability will have the (literally) 
perverse impact of encouraging affairs.277 Either way, the action does 
not deter the party who has the most control over initiating the 
relationship—the adulterous spouse.278 
Another way to conceptualize the deterrence function is through 
its positive correlative—the normative function.279 By recognizing 
societal values, the continuing existence of these torts confirms 
people’s views that adultery is wrong and that their decision not to 
partake in it is correct. Thus, even when the quantifiable deterrence 
value may seem nominal, the existence of the tort can shape behavior 
normatively.280 Deterrence and normative functions alone seem an 
uneasy justification, but the arguments for compensation provide 
more support for the torts’ viability. 
 
 274. See Cohen, supra note 137, at 636 (“Indeed, the failure of deterrence is evidenced by 
the sheer ubiquity of marital infidelity.”). 
 275. POSNER, supra note 78, at 82.  
 276. See, e.g., Batchelor, supra note 40, at 1940–42 (discussing this phenomenon in the 
criminal-conversation context).  
 277. See Coleman, supra note 251, at 409 (“When an estimated sixty percent of American 
adults have extramarital affairs, it is hardly credible to suggest criminal laws have had any 
deterrent effect. In fact, the danger associated with forbidden conduct may enhance the sexual 
experience, paradoxically increasing the likelihood it will occur.”).  
 278. See, e.g., O’Neil, 733 P.2d at 698 (“The action for alienation of affections purportedly 
exists to discourage third persons from weakening marriages. However, a marriage is not likely 
to falter without the active participation of one of its members.”); see also Bearbower v. Merry, 
266 N.W.2d 128, 138 (Iowa 1978) (McCormick, J., dissenting) (“It is simplistic and unrealistic to 
suppose the edifice [of marriage] will be held together either so long as or because spouses have 
the right to obtain vengeance in the form of damage suits against the third person.”). 
 279. See COCHRAN JR. & ACKERMAN, supra note 232, at 230 (noting the two functions are 
“closely related”).  
 280. Corbett, supra note 215, at 1055 n.365. 
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C. Tort Law and Compensation 
Any justification for these torts rests more comfortably on a 
compensatory theory: the defendant has caused harm to a person, 
which requires compensation.281 Proponents of the two torts point out 
that damages in alienation of affection and criminal conversation turn 
on many of the same issues as loss-of-consortium claims.282 
Accordingly, our tort system at least assumes that these injuries are 
compensable.283 The torts seek to compensate emotional harm, which 
may be hard to appraise. Nonetheless, some courts posit that 
emotional harm in these torts is “no more difficult to value than pain 
and suffering in a personal injury action or the loss of comfort, 
society, and companionship in an action for wrongful death.”284 
Nevertheless, the compensation has to relate to the harm caused 
and the interest articulated by courts rationalizing the torts: loss of 
consortium or emotional harm to the spouse and, in some cases, to 
the children of the marriage. Claiming the actions of an adulterer 
harmed some abstract concept of marriage ignores the fact that 
marriages are merely associations of individuals. Besides, trying to 
compensate harm to “marriage” creates complicated causation issues 
given that “infidelity may be the result, not the cause, of marital 
difficulties.”285 There may be good policy arguments for eliminating 
damages arising from adultery,286 but these arguments do not 
 
 281. See id. at 1021 (discussing the compensation theory).  
 282. See McMillian, supra note 7, at 1994 (“[S]uch as the state of the parties’ marriage prior 
to the tortious conduct, the sexual intimacies of the marriage, and the causal link between the 
tortious conduct and the state of the parties’ marriage post-injury.”).  
 283. See id. at 1995 (“The closeness between these other areas of law and alienation of 
affections demonstrates that tort remedies are properly employed as adultery-remedying 
tools.”). 
 284. Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1217 (Utah 1983). Indeed, uncertainty in damages is 
not a constitutional argument outside of the punitive context: 
Pain and suffering is notoriously difficult to calculate, but we still allow juries to take 
their best shot. Tort damages for the death of a child cannot bring that child back to 
life, but they are nevertheless appropriate, and no one says otherwise. The whole 
point of loss of consortium is to compensate for things lost in a marriage through the 
actions of a third party. These examples show that the inherent problem of 
anticommodification affects the tort system as a whole. Although imperfect, money 
remains the best means we have for compensating injured parties, including plaintiffs 
who assert claims for damages arising from the injuries left in adultery’s wake. 
McMillian, supra note 7, at 2003–04 (footnote omitted).  
 285. Cohen, supra note 137, at 636. 
 286. See, e.g., McDougal, supra note 6, at 184–86 (discussing policy arguments).  
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implicate the Constitution.287 If a state’s judiciary or legislature 
determines that damages are needed to compensate victims of marital 
interlopers,288 and adequately polices the damages, the law could 
indeed pass a higher level of scrutiny. However, if the actions are 
used instead to regulate sexual conduct by punishing those who 
engage in disfavored conduct, the actions may be overbroad 
unconstitutional infringements. This tough tailoring question should 
consider other tort remedies available to the plaintiff that do not base 
damages directly—and in some cases only—on the sexual conduct,289 
or that carry the baggage of precedent that assumes compensation lies 
in a forced sale of affections as property.290 
D. Tort Law and Tailoring 
Interests in deterrence and compensation can be executed 
through more consistent regulatory frameworks. The following 
analysis of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and 
negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) offers insight into 
how these marital torts could be reworked to avoid constitutional 
issues. 
1. IIED in the Marital Context.  Alienation of affection and 
criminal conversation may be unnecessary because of the availability 
of IIED.291 The elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress 
vary by jurisdiction, but the tort generally requires “(1) extreme and 
outrageous conduct; (2) which is intended to cause and does in fact 
cause; (3) severe emotional distress.”292 Courts have recognized that 
 
 287. See Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1217 (“The rule that affirms the availability of a cause of action 
despite uncertainties in the assessment of damages is of course implemented in the context of 
appropriate jury instructions and the court’s power to require remittitur to restrain or reduce 
arbitrary or excessive jury verdicts.”). 
 288. Tort law may fill gaps in family-law compensation structures. See Benjamin Shmueli, 
What Have Calabresi & Melamed Got to Do with Family Affairs? Women Using Tort Law in 
Order to Defeat Jewish and Shari’a Law, 25 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 125, 129 (2010) 
(“Tort law can award the victim ‘consolatory’ damages in cases where the remedies in family 
law are insufficient for legal or technical reasons.”). 
 289. Criminal conversation uses this calculus for damages. 
 290. Both criminal conversation and alienation of affection have this background. See supra 
Part I.C.  
 291. See Meredith L. Taylor, Comment, North Carolina’s Recognition of Tort Liability for 
the Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress During Marriage, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
1261, 1267–76 (1997) (noting the availability of IIED claims in the marital context).  
 292. Poston v. Poston, 436 S.E.2d 854, 856 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (citation omitted).  
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IIED is different from alienation of affection, and that a claim for 
IIED could result from a failed marital relationship.293 
One problem that could emerge in trying to use IIED in place of 
alienation of affection or criminal conversation is that a judge or jury 
may find “adultery does not evidence the extreme and outrageous 
conduct” required by IIED claims.294 Given the prevalence of 
adultery, it is hard for adulterous conduct to meet the extreme and 
outrageous threshold.295 However, given the large damages juries 
award in alienation-of-affection and criminal-conversation cases,296 
courts should not conclude this as a matter of law. 
Courts also cite constitutional privacy rights when denying claims 
for IIED in the marital context.297 Again, if this legal denial is correct, 
alienation-of-affection and criminal-conversation claims cannot stand 
as torts because they implicate the same constitutional concerns.298 
But if they can pass constitutional scrutiny, then courts cannot 
categorically deny relief in the IIED context.299 
Yet IIED claims cannot serve as a substitute for alienation-of-
affection and criminal-conversation torts for a third reason: IIED 
requires that the defendant intend to cause emotional harm to the 
 
 293. See, e.g., Van Meter v. Van Meter, 328 N.W.2d 497, 498 (Iowa 1983) (recognizing the 
difference between alienation-of-affections claims and IIED claims and concluding the issue of 
whether a failed marital relationship states a claim for IIED is fact-specific and therefore should 
be resolved at summary judgment or trial). Recognizing a claim for IIED in the marital context 
would not cause any problem for states that have abolished criminal conversation and alienation 
of affection because those states could continue to rule it out for the same public policy reasons 
that motivated their abolition of alienation of affection and criminal conversation in the first 
place. See, e.g., Doe v. Doe, 747 A.2d 617, 625 (Md. 2000) (“The public policy of this State, 
reflected in the abolition of the actions for alienation of affections and criminal conversation, 
required the dismissal of the tort actions asserted in this case.”). 
 294. Poston, 436 S.E.2d at 856. 
 295. See Ira Mark Ellman & Stephen D. Sugarman, Spousal Emotional Abuse As A Tort?, 
55 MD. L. REV. 1268, 1317 (1996) (“Certainly if one believes that a finding of ‘outrage’ in IIED 
cases must involve behavior that goes well beyond the common complaints divorcing spouses 
have about one another, then neither adultery alone nor deceitful adultery can qualify.”). 
 296. For a discussion of these large damages awards, see supra notes 7–20 and 
accompanying text.  
 297. See, e.g., Padwa v. Hadley, 981 P.2d 1234, 1241 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999) (“It is difficult to 
envision how the cuckolded spouse or lover could successfully state a claim in tort against the 
third party, whatever the label, without simultaneously trammelling the privacy rights and 
liberty interests of the other spouse, or the former spouse or partner.”).  
 298. See supra Part III.  
 299. Unless there exists some constitutionally principled distinction between IIED on the 
one hand, and alienation-of-affection and criminal-conversation torts on the other, then there is 
no basis for such categorical denials.  
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plaintiff.300 That element has never been a part of alienation-of-
affection or criminal-conversation torts.301 The emotional harm results 
from the surrounding situation, not just the intent of the interloping 
party. But divorce, even without adultery, causes severe emotional 
harm, and tort law should not overcompensate, or force parties to 
compensate harm they are not alone responsible for creating.302 
2. NIED in the Marital Context.  Could NIED contain an 
adequate level of culpability and causation? Some courts have 
allowed NIED claims in adulterous contexts.303 However, NIED 
claims will not likely prove a helpful substitute to alienation-of-
affection and criminal-conversation claims. NIED claims commonly 
arise in three scenarios, but only one scenario comes close to the 
typical adulterous relationship.304 Some jurisdictions allow NIED 
recovery when a person negligently causes serious emotional harm to 
another and it “occurs in the course of specified categories of 
activities, undertakings, or relationships in which negligent conduct is 
especially likely to cause serious emotional harm.”305 This can occur, 
for example, in the doctor–patient context if the doctor misdiagnoses 
his patient with a serious disease.306 This can extend in some cases to 
recovery against medical providers by a spouse for a resulting 
divorce.307 Courts that have allowed IIED or NIED claims to proceed 
against adulterous paramours represent cases that often concern 
adultery that occurred within a special-relationship capacity, such as 
 
 300. Poston v. Poston, 436 S.E.2d 854, 856 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993). 
 301. See supra Part I.  
 302. See, e.g., Martin v. Elliotte, No. 160440, 1998 WL 972222, at *8 (Va. Cir. Ct. June 5, 
1998) (“Many individuals who experience the trauma of divorce suffer from situational 
depression and the hardship that Plaintiff is enduring. This lawsuit cannot mend a broken heart 
or vindicate morality.”). 
 303. Heiner v. Simpson, 23 P.3d 1041, 1043 (Utah 2001) (holding that the plaintiff could 
bring claims for alienation of affection, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent 
infliction of emotional distress as a matter of law). 
 304. See Ellman & Sugarman, supra note 295, at 1299–1300 (explaining that the first two 
NIED scenarios allow claims when one is put in fear of physical injury or is emotionally shocked 
by seeing their loved ones killed or injured). 
 305. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 47 (Am. Law Inst. 2012). 
 306. See, e.g., Hedgepeth v. Whitman Walker Clinic, 22 A.3d 789, 792 (D.C. 2011) (allowing 
an NIED claim past summary judgment when doctor misdiagnosed patient with HIV).  
 307. See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 814–15, 821 (Cal. 1980) (en 
banc) (holding that the plaintiff stated a claim for NIED when a doctor misdiagnosed a woman 
with syphilis and told her to tell her husband, which caused the breakup of their marriage). 
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with a pastor, psychologist, or other counselor.308 Although the 
special-relationship NIED claim would serve some of the same 
compensation goals that alienation of affection serves, it is unlikely a 
legal framework could be extrapolated to all cases of adulterous 
affairs. However, the ability of tort law to impute a negligence duty to 
legally recognized special relationships is an insight that tailoring 
should take into account. 
3. Blending IIED and NIED in the Marital Context.  Employing 
existing IIED/NIED frameworks and creating a statutorily or 
judicially imposed special-relationship tort for the marital context 
could solve the constitutional problems with alienation of affection 
and criminal conversation and still support their assumed legitimate 
interests. At least one scholar, Professor Corbett, has proposed a 
revised tort for alienation-of-affection and criminal-conversation 
claims309: “[T]he elements of the new intentional interference with 
marriage tort would be the existence of a valid marriage, defendant’s 
knowledge of existence of marriage, and sexual relations between the 
defendant and the spouse.”310 Professor Corbett confines his tort—
intentional interference with marriage—only to instances of 
adulterous sex.311 The new tort would require knowledge of the 
marriage on the part of the offending third party, solving criminal 
conversation’s deterrence problem of overinclusion.312 Professor 
Corbett also advocates removing the alienation-of-affection element 
requiring “proof of alienation of love and affection.”313 Although not 
constitutionally mandated, removing this element with its farcically 
low level of required proof would save judicial resources and move 
what is essentially a question of loss of consortium to its proper place, 
“valuation of damages.”314 
 
 308. Greenstein, supra note 26, at 743–45 (discussing the case of a marital counselor who 
became a paramour of one of the spouses he was counseling, as well as discussing other 
potential claims other than IIED or NIED that courts have entertained in similar contexts). 
 309. Corbett, supra note 215, at 1053–54. 
 310. Id. at 1054. Professor Corbett also retains consent of the nonparticipating spouse as a 
defense to this tort. Id.  
 311. Id.  
 312. See id. at 1053 (“[T]he knowledge requirement ensures that the interferer has a high 
level of culpability or blameworthiness. Without the knowledge requirement, one could be 
liable for interference with marriage for having sexual relations with a married person who 
misrepresented his marital status.”).  
 313. Id. at 1053–54. 
 314. Id. at 1054. 
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Reevaluating the precedential support for alienation of affection 
and criminal conversation could remove some of their worst 
attributes. First, alienation-of-affection and criminal-conversation 
claims continue to cite as precedent cases echoing the tort’s 
detestable property-based common-law origins and purposes.315 If 
adultery is morally reprehensible, the idea that a cuckolded spouse 
should be compensated principally for loss of sexual services should 
raise some eyebrows.316 These historical interests do not have to be 
imported into the new tort.317 Second, part of the pragmatic concern 
for reforming or striking these torts is the uncertain damages granted 
by courts in these cases.318 Reformulating the tort as an offshoot of 
IIED and NIED precedent, but in the special relationship of 
marriage, would give litigants, judges, and juries the benefit of case 
law much less amenable to granting speculative damages.319 
V.  THE EVOLVING CONCEPT OF MARITAL CHOICE IN  
OBERGEFELL V. HODGES 
A. Applying Alienation of Affection and Criminal Conversation To 
All Marriages Equally 
Obergefell held that “same-sex couples may exercise the 
fundamental right to marry in all States.”320 To survive constitutional 
scrutiny, alienation of affection, criminal conversation, or any revised 
tort will have to be available to those in same-sex marriages.321 
 
 315. See supra Part I.C. 
 316. See Batchelor, supra note 40, at 1930 (“To classify love, affection, and sexual autonomy 
as a property right is an outdated and unrealistic way of looking at marriage.”). 
 317. Corbett, supra note 215, at 1046 (“It is not necessary that a modern tort of interference 
with marriage be based on anachronistic principles regarding men’s property interests in their 
wives.”). 
 318. See, e.g., McDougal, supra note 6, at 185 (noting the damages in such cases are 
generally punitive in nature, despite the fact that the tort purports to compensate the plaintiff 
for an actual loss).  
 319. However, this reluctance may itself hinder the compensation goals. See, e.g., Martha 
Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463, 530 
(1998) (“The current skepticism toward compensation for emotional and relational harms is 
disproportionate: It discounts the importance of these injuries in the lives of tort victims and 
places too much emphasis on general fears of unlimited liability and concerns about difficulties 
of administration.”).  
 320. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015). 
 321. This question is different from whether an action for criminal conversation can occur 
absent penile-vaginal intercourse, see supra note 39, and whether homosexual conduct can 
sustain an action for alienation of affections, cf. Blaylock v. Strecker, 724 S.W.2d 470, 471–72, 
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States must abandon the traditional justifications for alienation-
of-affection and criminal-conversation torts in light of Obergefell. 
Alienation of affection and criminal conversation presuppose a 
marriage between a man and a woman.322 Not applying the torts to 
same-sex marriages would constitute a substantive-due-process or 
equal-protection violation.323 Thus, courts will likely have to drop 
protection of “traditional” marriage and familial structures as a 
justification for the torts.324 
The reaction of courts following the Married Women’s Property 
Act offers one possible avenue for states that desire to maintain the 
torts;325 courts could revise or expand the theory originally behind the 
torts. State courts that did not abolish alienation-of-affection or 
criminal-conversation torts following the enactment of the Married 
Women’s Property Act judicially revised the tort’s purposes to 
 
476 (Ark. 1987) (entertaining an appeal of an alienation-of-affections tort where the wife had a 
relationship with another woman). Same-sex marriage was not an option until recently in most 
of the states that retain the action, and courts had only applied the torts to heterosexual 
marriage. Cf. Rushing v. Barron, No. COA11-1471, 2012 N.C. App. LEXIS 972, at *5 (N.C. Ct. 
App. Aug. 7, 2012) (noting, in the context of a suit by a daughter against her brother and father 
for conspiring to alienate the affection of her mother, that “North Carolina has never 
recognized alienation of affection for any relationship other than that of spouses”). 
 322. “It cannot be denied that this Court’s cases describing the right to marry presumed a 
relationship involving opposite-sex partners.” Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598; Nicolas, supra note 
39, at 114 (“[T]he initial rationales for the torts were both to vindicate the husband’s property 
interests in his wife’s services and to compensate him for the risk of ‘spurious issue’ that the 
third party’s conduct introduced . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 323. It is unclear what legal rationale the Court used to strike down bans on same-sex 
marriage. Whether one views Justice Kennedy’s opinions on the subject as magniloquence or 
inspiring prose, neither U.S. v. Windsor nor Obergefell are strictly grounded in substantive-due-
process or equal-protection analysis alone. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2590 (“Rights implicit in 
liberty and rights secured by equal protection may rest on different precepts and are not always 
coextensive, yet in some instances each may be instructive as to the meaning and reach of the 
other.”); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (holding that the Defense of 
Marriage Act “violates basic due process and equal protection principles applicable to the 
Federal Government”). Whatever the exact test, restricting the torts to opposite-sex marriages 
would be unconstitutional. See Nicolas, supra note 39, at 125 (making the same argument in 
terms of criminal adultery statutes,).  
 324. Same-sex marriage warrants all the same protections as opposite-sex marriage. 
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601 (“The States have contributed to the fundamental character of the 
marriage right by placing that institution at the center of so many facets of the legal and social 
order. There is no difference between same- and opposite-sex couples with respect to this 
principle.”); see also McMillian, supra note 7, at 2014 (“[Given t]his near-universal consensus 
that the government occupies the preeminent role in the construction and sanction of the 
marriage . . . then it follows that the state should be empowered to protect that which it has 
birthed.”).  
 325. Notably, Obergefell mentions laws struck down by the Court that imposed sex-based 
inequalities in marriage. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603–04.  
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include “preserving marital harmony by deterring wrongful 
interference with it; providing compensatory damages for 
humiliation, disgrace, dishonor, and mental suffering; and punishing 
the invasion of the exclusive right to marital intercourse.”326 In this 
way, the courts preserved the torts by offering gender-neutral 
rationales for its continued existence. This framework should make 
the construction of a new tort based in IIED and NIED precedent 
more appealing, focusing the tort on compensation for the emotional 
harm to the nonadulterous spouse. 
B. Abandoning The Torts in Favor of Less State Involvement in 
Marriage 
Although not constitutionally required, the few remaining states 
with alienation-of-affection and criminal-conversation torts could 
avoid any judicial retooling and simply abandon the torts wholesale. 
Most people I spoke to when drafting this Note did not, at first, 
believe these torts existed.327 When convinced of their continued 
vitality, many disliked the idea of the government intruding so far 
into matters of personal choice. But few people blink an eye at the 
expansive role marital status now plays in our society. In federal law, 
marital status can determine whether someone receives government 
benefits, the relative priority of assets in bankruptcy proceedings, the 
amount of taxes someone pays, and even criminal liability.328 Marital 
status plays an even bigger role at the state level: 
States . . . throughout our history made marriage the basis for an 
expanding list of governmental rights, benefits, and responsibilities. 
These aspects of marital status include: taxation; inheritance and 
property rights; rules of intestate succession; spousal privilege in the 
law of evidence; hospital access; medical decisionmaking authority; 
adoption rights; the rights and benefits of survivors; birth and death 
certificates; professional ethics rules; campaign finance restrictions; 
 
 326. Nicolas, supra note 39, at 114 (footnotes omitted). 
 327. I drafted my Note while residing in the great state of North Carolina where state courts 
see the most alienation-of-affection and criminal-conversation suits in the nation. That almost 
all the people I encountered—including many who have chosen to pursue a career in the law—
did not know of these torts provides more, albeit anecdotal, evidence that these torts are not a 
very good deterrent.  
 328. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694 (2013) (discussing federal laws that involve marital 
status); see also Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601 (“Valid marriage under state law is also a 
significant status for over a thousand provisions of federal law.”). 
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workers’ compensation benefits; health insurance; and child custody, 
support, and visitation rules.329 
Obergefell prompted an inquiry into whether this course of 
action has been fruitful. The current sweeping entanglement of the 
State with marital choice certainly is not based on the foundations of 
our democracy or our Constitution.330 “In the American legal 
tradition, liberty has long been understood as individual freedom 
from governmental action, not as a right to a particular governmental 
entitlement.”331 Predicating criminal liability, government 
entitlements, and civil penalties on marital status has consumed 
immeasurable government resources. Courts will likely now face even 
more daunting legal questions as a result of state entanglement with 
marital choice,332 such as what to do when state actors stop licensing 
marriages altogether,333 or what to do when state officials cite their 
religious rights to avoid issuing marriage licenses.334 Although many 
may disagree about the relative benefits of state involvement with 
marital matters, alienation-of-affection and criminal-conversation 
torts represent at least one area in which it might be wise to rethink 
how much the government involves itself in private family matters. 
 
 329. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601. 
 330. In his dissent in Obergefell, Justice Thomas wrote:  
[R]eceiving governmental recognition and benefits has nothing to do with any 
understanding of ‘liberty’ that the Framers would have recognized. To the extent that 
the Framers would have recognized a natural right to marriage that fell within the 
broader definition of liberty, it would not have included a right to governmental 
recognition and benefits. Instead, it would have included a right to engage in the very 
same activities that petitioners have been left free to engage in—making vows, 
holding religious ceremonies celebrating those vows, raising children, and otherwise 
enjoying the society of one’s spouse—without governmental interference. At the 
founding, such conduct was understood to predate government, not to flow from it. 
Id. at 2636. 
 331. Id. at 2634. 
 332. See id. at 2625 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Today’s decision, for example, creates 
serious questions about religious liberty.”). 
 333. See, e.g., Amy Yurkanin, Two Counties Out of Marriage Business for Good After 
Supreme Court Ruling, AL.COM (June 29, 2015, 10:52 AM), http://www.al.com/news/
index.ssf/2015/06/alabama_probate_office_closes.html [http://perma.cc/8FF7-KCSU] (stating 
two Alabama counties stopped issuing marriage licenses altogether after Obergefell).  
 334. This situation occurred when Kentucky clerk Kim Davis, who rose to national 
prominence when she said her faith stopped her from issuing licenses to same-sex couples. For 
an in-depth discussion of legal issues surrounding these objections, see Eugene Volokh, When 
Does your Religion Legally Excuse You from Doing Part of Your Job? WASH. POST: VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Sep. 4, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/
09/04/when-does-your-religion-legally-excuse-you-from-doing-part-of-your-job [http://perma.cc/
NWG2-EG4A]. 
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Finally, Justice Kennedy’s discombobulating blend of equal 
protection and substantive due process335 in Obergefell may signal 
another evolution in constitutional law by indicating that state action 
which infringes on these fundamental rights of personal dignity, 
intimacy, and marital choice should not be left to the political process 
when the state’s justifications hinge on essentially moral objections.336 
The arguments against adultery and same-sex marriage are strikingly 
similar. Many Americans believe adultery and same-sex marriage 
harm the institution of marriage and the traditional idea of family. 
Many Americans find both practices morally repugnant. Those beliefs 
are not the problem, but they become a problem “when that sincere, 
personal opposition becomes enacted law and public policy . . . [and] 
put[s] the imprimatur of the State itself on an exclusion that soon 
demeans or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then denied.”337 
Same-sex couples were denied their fundamental right to marry based 
on these personal moral convictions when heterosexual couples faced 
no impediments to exercising their rights. Unmarried adulterers 
similarly are denied their fundamental right to intimacy and their 
right to intimate association while their married counterparts are 
beyond the reach of the State. This comparison is not meant to 
demean the marital rights of same-sex couples, rather it is to suggest 
that Obergefell could stand for the proposition that, when it comes to 
these deeply personal rights of intimacy, marital choice, and 
association, the State should exit.338 “[C]onstitutional law 
 
 335. Kennedy’s lack of clarity can lead to odd results, like one Tennessee judge who cited 
Obergefell as removing authority from the states to issue divorces. Michael Miller, Tenn. Judge 
Refuses to Grant Straight Couple a Divorce Because … Gay Marriage, WASH. POST (Sep. 4, 
2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/09/04/tenn-judge-refuses-to-
grant-straight-couple-a-divorce-because-of-gay-marriage [http://perma.cc/3VXZ-P3F6].  
 336. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602 (“[E]ach case inquired about the right to marry in its 
comprehensive sense, asking if there was a sufficient justification for excluding the relevant class 
from the right.” (citations omitted)); id. (“[W]hen that sincere, personal opposition becomes 
enacted law and public policy, the necessary consequence is to put the imprimatur of the State 
itself on an exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then 
denied.”); id. at 2604 (“The imposition of this disability on gays and lesbians serves to disrespect 
and subordinate them.”); id. at 2605 (“There may be an initial inclination in these cases to 
proceed with caution—to await further legislation, litigation, and debate. . . . [T]he Constitution 
contemplates that democracy is the appropriate process for change, so long as that process does 
not abridge fundamental rights.”).  
 337. Id. at 2602. 
 338. See, e.g., Act of July 21, 2015, Ill. Pub. Act 099-0090, art. I (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (abolishing, 
inter alia, alienation-of-affection and criminal-conversation actions in Illinois).  
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appropriately exists for those situations where representative 
government cannot be trusted, not those where we know it can.”339 
CONCLUSION 
The constitutionality of regulating adultery through tort is 
complicated, to say the least. Nevertheless, a tort of marital 
interference could serve any compensation or deterrence goals 
without the same constitutional pitfalls of alienation of affection and 
criminal conversation. If no such tort action is created, and courts 
accept states’ interest in compensation and deterrence, alienation of 
affection is likely to be maintained—but it may be similarly 
constrained.340 Be that as it may, there is no legitimate reason to 
continue criminal-conversation actions341 because alienation of 
affection is a less restrictive alternative serving the same purpose.342 
Recently, the Supreme Court reformulated the very definition of 
marriage.343 It is time to conform alienation of affection and criminal 
conversation to the Constitution and rethink government 
involvement in matters of personal marital choice and intimacy. 
 
 
 339. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 183 
(1980). 
 340. See supra Part IV.  
 341. As has been previously stated, the lack of the marital-knowledge requirement in 
criminal-conversation claims renders the tort overbroad. See Batchelor, supra note 40, at 1937 
(“Despite the frequency with which actions for criminal conversation are brought, it is very 
likely that a third party defendant might not have any idea that the partner with whom he or she 
has begun a sexual relationship is married or legally separated if the partner does not disclose 
that fact.”).  
 342. See, e.g., Norton v. Macfarlane, 818 P.2d 8, 17 (Utah 1991) (“To the extent that the tort 
of criminal conversation provides a cause of action for adultery when the marriage commitment 
is dead, it serves no useful purpose in awarding damages. If the marriage commitment of the 
spouses is not dead, the tort of alienation of affections provides an adequate legal remedy.”).  
 343. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607–08. 
